|
|
 |
 |
|
 |
| |
|
|
|
|
Negotiating Environmental Quality |
Markus A. Lehmann, Economic Advisor, Social, Economic and Legal Affairs, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme, Canada
|
| 2000 |
264 pp |
Hardback |
978 1 85898 976 1 |
£79.00 |
on-line discount
£71.10 |
|
|
|
Using strategic game theory, this innovative book carefully reviews the detailed negotiations between industry, regulating agencies, and third parties in environmental policy implementation. The analysis is underpinned by an institutional comparison of German and American administrative and environmental law.
After presenting an alternative model to address real-world bargaining, Markus Lehmann provides an economic rationale for the use of case-to-case regulation, a policy instrument traditionally neglected if not rejected by environmental economists. He discusses how and to what extent the shortcomings of this instrument can be overcome by a specific institutional design. He presents a clear-cut policy conclusion which is shown to be quite robust under different model structures and varying sets of assumptions.
|
Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Discretion, Agency Control and Judicial Review in Germany and the United States 3. Standing, Collusion and Collusion Deterrence 4. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Asymmetrical Standing 5. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Symmetrical Standing 6. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Incomplete Information 7. Conclusions References Index
|
This book is part of the New Horizons in Environmental Economics series. To view the rest of the series, please use the link.
View
New Horizons in Environmental Economics series books 
View More Information
|
|
|
|
 |
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
