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Game Theory And International Relations |
Edited by Pierre Allan, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland and Christian Schmidt, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Dauphine, France
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| 1994 |
232 pp |
Hardback |
978 1 85278 925 1 |
£74.00 |
on-line discount
£66.60 |
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At the cutting edge of current modelling in international relations using non-cooperative game theory, this collection of original contributions from political scientists and economists explores some of the fundamental assumptions of game theory modelling. It includes a theory of game payoff formation, a theory of preference aggregation, thorough discussions of the effects of interdependence between preferences upon various game structures, in-depth analyses of the impact of incomplete information upon dynamic games of negotiation, and a study using differential games. Numerous illustrations, case studies and comparative case studies show the relevance of the theoretical debate. The chapters are organised to allow readers with a limited knowledge of game theory to develop their understanding of the fundamental issues.
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Contents: Introduction Part I: Preference Formation and Aggregation Part II: Interdependent Preferences and Rational Choice Part III: Dynamic Games and Information Index
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