CENTRAL BANKING IN HISTORY

Hardback

CENTRAL BANKING IN HISTORY

9781852785697 Edward Elgar Publishing
Edited by Michael Collins, formerly of Leeds University Business School, UK
Publication Date: 1993 ISBN: 978 1 85278 569 7 Extent: 1,264 pp
The role and performance of central banks has always been of critical concern to economists and politicians alike. The post-War concensus that viewed central banks as engaging in discretionary economic management has been replaced by controversy over the best means of controlling monetary growth and stopping inflation.

Copyright & permissions

Recommend to librarian

Your Details

Privacy Policy

Librarian Details

Download leaflet

Print page

More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The role and performance of central banks has always been of critical concern to economists and politicians alike. The post-War concensus that viewed central banks as engaging in discretionary economic management has been replaced by controversy over the best means of controlling monetary growth and stopping inflation.

This important reference collection provides essential historical perspective to the whole issue of the most appropriate means of constituting and operating a central bank. Drawing on contributions from the 17th century to the present, it highlights the different approaches adopted by bankers, economists and politicians. The wide range of selected essays and papers draw on varying experience in a number of countries (including the US, the UK, Japan, Germany and Canada) and embraces two centuries of debate on the role of the central bank as the government''s bank, as lender of last resort and as arbiter of monetary growth.
Critical Acclaim
‘This fascinating reference collection provides a valuable historical perspective on the question of the most appropriate means of constituting and operating a central bank.’
– Banking World
Contributors
24 articles, dating from 1695 to 1986
Contributors include: F. Baring, I. Fisher, M. Godfrey, J.M. Keynes, D. Kinley, O.M.W. Sprague, R. Torrens
Contents
Volume I

CENTRAL BANK FUNCTIONS

Acknowledgements
Introduction

PART I: THE GOVERNMENT''S BANK

1. Michael Godfrey (1695), A Short Account of the Bank of England, pp 1-8.
2. W. Lexis (1910), ‘Concerning the Renewal of the Reichsbank Privilege.’
3. Baron Sakatani, S. Naruse and O.M.W. Sprague (1911), ‘The Banking System of Japan.’
4. John Maynard Keynes (1913), ‘Indian Banking’.

PART II: MONETARY MANAGEMENT

5. Henry Thornton (1939), An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain, (1802), edited with an introduction by F.A. v. Hayek, pp 103-16, 122-4, 227-9, 286-94.
6. R.S. Sayers (1957), ‘The Bank of England in 1953.’
7. E.P. Neufeld (1958), ‘The Bank of Canada''s Approach to Central Banking.’

PART II: LENDER OF LAST RESORT

8. Sir Francis Baring, Bart. (1797), Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and on the Paper Circulation of the Country.
9. Thomson Hankey (1876), ‘Banking in Connection with the Currency and the Bank of England.’
10. Walter Bagehot (1866), ‘What a Panic is and How it Might be Migrated.’
11. Walter Bagehot (1919), ‘The Bank''s Administration of the Reserve.’
12. David Kinley (1910), ‘Conclusions as to Treasury Relief in Crises’ and ‘Summary.’
13. O.M.W. Sprague (1910), ‘The Treasury and the Panic.’
14. Maurice Patron (1910), ‘The Bank of France and Crises.’
15. Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo (1984), ‘Industry and Finance in Italy, 1918-1940.’
16. Vera C. Smith (1936), ‘Discussions in America Prior to the Foundation of the Federal Reserve System.’
17. Vera C. Smith (1936), ‘The Arguments in Favour of Central Banking Reconsidered.’
18. Lawrence H. White (1984), ‘The Relevance of Free Banking Today.’
19. Dr Alexander Erdély (1910), ‘The New Swiss Central Note Bank.’
20. Fred Hirsch (1977), ‘The Bagehot Problem.’
21. Harry G. Johnson (1968), ‘Problems of Efficiency in Monetary Management.’
22. C.A.E. Goodhart (1987), ‘Why do Banks Need a Central Bank?’

Name Index

Volume II

PERFORMANCE

Acknowledgements

PART I: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Charles A. Conant (1896), ‘The Bank of the United States.’
2. Walter Bagehot (1919), ‘The Principles Which Should Regulate the Amount of Banking Reserve To Be Kept By The Bank of England.’
3. J.W. Gilbart (1907), ‘The Baring Crisis and its Lessons.’
4. L.S. Pressnell (1968), ‘Gold Reserves, Banking Reserves, and the Baring Crisis of 1890.’


PART II: MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

5. Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (1986), ‘The Credit Policies of the Reichsbank.’
6. John Maynard Keynes (1925), ‘The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchhill.’
7. Irving Fisher (1927), ‘The Activities of the Federal Reserve System.’
8. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963), ‘The Great Contraction, 1929-33.’
9. R.S. Sayers (1949), ‘Central Banking in the Light of Recent British and American Experience.’
10. Hyman P. Minsky (1957), ‘Central Banking and Money Market Changes.’

Name Index

Volume III

DISCRETION AND AUTONOMY

Acknowledgements

1. William Paterson (1694), A Brief Account of the Intended Bank of England, pp 1-18.
2. R. Torrens (1837), A Letter to the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Melbourne on the Causes of the Recent Derangement in the Money Market, and on the Bank Reform.
3. Thomas Tooke (1844), ‘Review of the Currency Principle in its Application to our Banking System.’
4. F.M. Taylor (1896), ‘Do we want an Elastic Currency?’
5. Paul M. Warburg (1911), ‘A United Reserve Bank of the United States.’
6. Lloyd W. Mints (1945), ‘A Brief Survey of Banking Literature Since 1913.’
7. R.S. Sayers (1957), ‘The Theoretical Basis of Central Banking.’
8. Irving Brecher (1957), ‘The End of the Central Bank Controversy.’
9. Irving Fisher (1934), ‘How to Stabilize: The Equation of Exchange.’
10. Henry C. Simons (1936), ‘Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy.’
11. Milton Friedman (1948), ‘A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability.’
12. Milton Friedman (1962), ‘Should there be an Independent Monetary Authority?’
13. Milton Friedman (1982), ‘Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice.’
14. Jacob Viner (1962), ‘The Necessary and Desirable Range of Discretion to be Allowed to a Monetary Authority.’

Name Index
My Cart