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Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

Edited by Francisco Cabrillo, Department of Applied Economics, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro, Department of Applied Economics, University of Valencia, Spain
This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.
Extent: 384 pp
Hardback Price: £101.00 Web: £90.90
Publication Date: 2013
ISBN: 978 1 78100 396 1
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Public Choice Theory
  • Politics and Public Policy
  • Public Choice
This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced ‘rules of the game’, towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory.

This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.
Contributors: P. Bernholz, V.K. Borooah, G. Brennan, G. Brosio, J.M. Buchanan, F. Cabrillo, R.D. Congleton, G. Eusepi, S. Fedeli, M. Ferrero, S. Fitzpatrick, F. Forte, B.S. Frey, J. Helin, M.J. Holler, J.D. Montoro-Pons, S. Neckermann, H. Nurmi, M. Paldam, M.A. Puchades-Navarro, G.C. Romagnoli, P. Salmon, V.J. Vanberg, B.-A. Wickström
Contents:

Foreword
Peter Boettke

Introduction
Francisco Cabrillo and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro

PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
1. Presuppositions in the Evaluation of Rules
James M. Buchanan

2. Buchanan, Hobbes and Contractarianism: The Supply of Rules?
Geoffrey Brennan and Giuseppe Eusepi

PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CASE STUDIES
3. Economic Governance in the European Union. A Problem of Legitimacy
Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick

4. Early Spanish Liberalism and Constitutional Political Economy: The Cádiz Constitution of 1812
Roger D. Congleton

5. Reforms and Decentralization: Friends or Foes?
Pierre Salmon

6. Democracy-Preserving Institutions: The Quasi-federal System of South Africa
Giorgio Brosio

PART III: POLITICAL COMPETITION AND VOTING
7. On Machiavelli?s Conspiracy Paradoxes
Manfred J. Holler

8. A General Measure of the ‘Effective’ Number of Parties in a Political System
Vani K. Borooah

9. Party Competition and Electoral Turnout: Downs’s Calculus in a Multiparty System
Juha Helin and Hannu Nurmi

PART IV: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
10. The Political Economy of Dutch Disease: A Survey
Martin Paldam

11. Higher Education as Private Good and as Quasi Public Good: The Case of Italy
Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte

12. The Actual Role of Government Intervention for the Recovery of the Italian Economy
Gian Cesare Romagnoli

13. Government Bankruptcy of Balkan Nations and the Consequences for Money and Inflation Before 1914: A Comparative Analysis
Peter Bernholz

PART V: EXTENSIONS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
14. Regulator Preferences and Lobbying Efforts in Rent-seeking Contests
Juan D. Montoro-Pons

15. Cooperation in Multilateral PDs: Self-selected vs. Pre-defined Groups
Viktor J. Vanberg

16. Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro

17. Awards Play an Important Role
Bruno S. Frey and Susanne Neckermann

18. The Optimal Babel: An Economic Framework for the Analysis of Dynamic Language Rights
Bengt-Arne Wickström

19. A Theory of Conversion to Exclusive Religions and Political Faiths
Mario Ferrero

Index