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Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour

Theory and Application
Frank Stähler, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Economic Theory, University of Kiel, Germany
Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is a seminal volume which introduces a model providing solutions to economic games subject to repeated play. It develops a link between strategic bargaining and the theory of self-enforcing contracts to give insights into the long-term relationships between two parties, such as firms or governments, who meet in a negotiating situation.
Extent: 272 pp
Hardback Price: £87.00 Online: £78.30
Publication Date: 1998
ISBN: 978 1 85898 905 1
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Econometrics
  • Game Theory
  • Industrial Organisation
Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is a seminal volume which introduces a model providing solutions to economic games subject to repeated play. It develops a link between strategic bargaining and the theory of self-enforcing contracts to give insights into the long-term relationships between two parties, such as firms or governments, who meet in a negotiating situation.

The author provides an original approach to strategic bargaining to find a solution to economic games in which cooperation cannot be enforced by a third party. He then applies this approach to a wide range of real life situations including international environmental agreements, bilateral trade agreements, collusion between firms in industry and bargaining between buyers and sellers in the market place. The author also discusses important policy implications as well as setting an agenda for future research.

Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is an original contribution to the existing literature which will be welcomed for providing accurate outcomes for situations in which conventional theories produce ambiguous results. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of microeconomics, game theory and industrial economics.
‘Researchers should find plenty of material of interest and certainly a perusal of at least the first three chapters and the concluding one should be rewarding and may well tempt one to go through the entire work.’
– S. Das Gupta, Zentralblatt fur Mathematik und ihre Grenzgebiete

‘In closing, allow me to shamelessly steal a Woody Allen joke which should not be a stranger to many readers of Kyklos. This is a forceful book, which is seriously written, well formatted, rich in economic applications and policy implications (to lesser extent, however), and just can not be read as fast (although great readability or light reading might be what the author takes pride to offer). One should not flip through it from cover to cover in one day and conclude: “It is about two-person repeated games with self-enforcing agreements’. Incidentally, I just reveal, in my humblest opinion, the most appropriate title of this interesting and most welcome monograph (Calling this Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour resembles renaming “Mighty Aphrodite” as “A Film by Woody Allen”.’
– Jong-Shin Wei, Kyklos
Contents: Preface 1. Preview 2. Strategic Bargaining and Self-enforcing Contracts 3. Bargaining for a Collective Good without Transfers 4. Bargaining for a Collective Good with Transfers 5. Bargaining between Buyer and Seller 6. Concluding Remarks 7. Appendix References Index