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Effective Federalism and Local Finance

The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series
Edited by Ehtisham Ahmad, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Germany and Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics Asia Research Centre, UK and Giorgio Brosio, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Turin, Italy
Fiscal federalism has been the subject of much scholarly debate over the years. These volumes successfully bring together seminal articles from the past fifty years to demonstrate how the focus has evolved from ‘first generation’ to ‘second generation’ theories of intergovermental relations. The editors enhance the collection with detailed analyses of how competition affects relations between varying levels of government, and examine the hypotheses underlying the theory of fiscal federalism. This set of authoritative papers will be an indispensable reference source for scholars and practitioners in this field.
Extent: 1,328 pp
Hardback Price: £441.00 Online: £396.90
Publication Date: 2011
ISBN: 978 1 84844 443 0
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Public Finance
  • Public Sector Economics
Fiscal federalism has been the subject of much scholarly debate over the years. These volumes successfully bring together seminal articles from the past fifty years to demonstrate how the focus has evolved from ‘first generation’ to ‘second generation’ theories of intergovermental relations. The editors enhance the collection with detailed analyses of how competition affects relations between varying levels of government, and examine the hypotheses underlying the theory of fiscal federalism. This set of authoritative papers will be an indispensable reference source for scholars and practitioners in this field.
50 articles, dating from 1961 to 2009
Contributors include: A. Breton, B. Dollery, T. Goodspeed, B. Huber, B. Lockwood, W. Oates, M. Olson Jr., V. Ostrom, J.P. Platteu, P. Salmon, P. Seabright
Contents:

Volume I – How Federal and Decentralized Systems Work and Institutional Underpinnings

Acknowledgements

Introduction Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio

PART I THEORETICAL ADVANCES
1. Roger B. Porter (1977) ‘John Stuart Mill and Federalism’
2. Wallace E. Oates (2008) ‘On the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions’
3. Mancur Olson, Jr., (1969), ‘The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government’
4. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren (1961), ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’
5. Wallace E. Oates (1981), ‘On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model’
6. Albert Breton (1987), ‘Towards a Theory of Competitive Federalism’
7. Paul Seabright (1996), ‘Accountability and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model’
8. Ben Lockwood (2009), ‘Political Economy Approaches to Fiscal Decentralization’
9. Pierre Salmon (1987), ‘Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme’

PART II MOBILITY AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
10. Federico Revelli (2008), ‘Performance Competition in Local Media Markets’
11. Jan K. Brueckner (2003), ‘Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studies’
12. Michael Keen (1998), ‘Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism’
13. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen (1993), ‘Jeux Sans Frontières: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size’
14. David E. Wildasin (2003), ‘Liberalization and the Spatial Allocation of Population in Developing and Transition Countries’
15. Avinash Dixit and John Londregan (1998), ‘Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics’

PART III INSTITUTIONS
16. Pierre Salmon (2002), ‘Decentralization and Supranationality: The Case of the European Union’
17. Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1996), ‘FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe’
18. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007), ‘A Contractual Approach to Multi-level Governance’
19. Roger D. Congleton, Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria (2009), ‘A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement’
20. J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (2002), ‘The Institutions of Executive Federalism: Myths and Realities’
21. Stephen Soul and Brian Dollery (2000), ‘An Analysis of the Criteria Used by Australian Local Government Amalgamation Inquiries Between 1960 and 1992’
22. Tugrul Gurgur and Anwar Shah (2002), ‘Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?’
23. C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin and Daniel Treisman (2009), ‘Political Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Around the World’


Volume II – Federal and Decentralized Policy, Governance, Issues and Challenges

An Introduction to both volumes by the editors appears in Volume I

PART I DECENTRALIZED POLICIES AND GOVERNANCE
1. Ehtisham Ahmad, Giorgio Brosio and Vito Tanzi (2008), ‘Local Service Provision in Selected OECD Countries: Do Decentralized Operations Work Better?’
2. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee (2005), ‘Decentralizing Anti-poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries’
3. Jean-Philippe Platteau (2009), ‘Information Distortion, Elite Capture and Task Complexity in Decentralized Development’
4. Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China’
5. Ehtisham Ahmad, Keping Li and Thomas Richardson (2002), ‘Recentralization in China?’

PART II FINANCING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
6. Maria Flavia Ambrosanio and Massimo Bordignon (2006), ‘Normative Versus Positive Theories of Revenue Assignments in Federations’
7. Wallace E. Oates (1999), ‘Local Property Taxation: An Assessment’
8. Robin Boadway (2009), ‘The Design of a VAT for Multi-Government Jurisdictions: Lessons from Canada’
9. Richard A. Musgrave (1961), ‘Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political Federalism’
10. Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager (2008), ‘Accountability and Fiscal Equalization’
11. Stephen J. Bailey and Stephen Connolly (1998), ‘The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further Research’
12. Ehtisham Ahmad, José González Anaya, Giorgio Brosio, Mercedes Garcia-Escribano, Ben Lockwood and Ernesto Revilla (2007), ‘Why Focus On Spending Needs Factors? The Political Economy of Fiscal Transfer Reforms in Mexico’
13. Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber (2005), ‘Transfers in a Polarized Country: Bridging the Gap Between Efficiency and Stability’

PART III TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
14. Charles E. McLure, Jr. (1983), ‘Fiscal Federalism and the Taxation of Economic Rents’
15. Giorgio Brosio (2003), ‘Oil Revenue and Fiscal Federalism’

PART IV GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
16. Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War and Raju Singh (2006), ‘Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations’
17. Thomas J. Nechyba (2008), ‘Public and Private School Competition and U.S. Fiscal Federalism’
18. Ivan Barankay and Ben Lockwood (2007), ‘Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence From Swiss Cantons’
19. Jon Magnussen, Terje P. Hagen and Oddvar M. Kaarboe (2007), ‘Centralized or Decentralized? A Case Study of Norwegian Hospital Reform’
20. Keith G. Banting and Stan Corbett (2002), ‘Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction’

PART V MACRO-FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUB NATIONAL DEBT
21. Yingyi Qian and Gérard Roland (1998), ‘Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint’
22. Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels (2002), ‘Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems’
23. Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel (2008), ‘Interregional Redistribution and Budget Institutions Under Asymmetric Information’

PART VI ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL DISASTERS
24. Wallace E. Oates (2002), ‘A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalsim’
25. Richard L. Revesz (1997), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique’
26. Alistair Ulph (1998), ‘Political Institutions and the Design of Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information’
27. Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout (2007), ‘On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation’