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Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Essential Readings Edited by Michael Finus, Professor, Chair in Environmental Economics, University of Bath, UK and Alejandro Caparrós, Associate Research Professor, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), and Deputy Director, Institute for Public Goods and Policies, Spain
This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.
Extent: 992 pp
Hardback Price: $470.00 Web: $423.00
Publication Date: 2015
ISBN: 978 1 78254 509 5
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Environmental Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Environment
  • Environmental Economics
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols’ impact on the success of cooperation.

This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.

'As the nations of the world struggle to negotiate an effective post-Kyoto international climate agreement, there is no area of economic scholarship that has more to offer than game theory. Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparrós, themselves leading scholars in this realm, have assembled a dream team of authors and a remarkable set of key articles from the best economics journals to produce a book with close to 50 chapters that should be essential reading for novices as well as experienced researchers'
– Robert Stavins, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, US
49 articles, dating from 1989 to 2014
Contributors include: G.B. Asheim, S. Barrett, C. Carraro, P.K. Dutta, M. Hoel, L.S. Karp, M. Kosfeld, K.G. Mäler, H. Tulkens, A. de Zeeuw
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparrós

PART I FOUNDATIONS
1. Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), ‘The Acid Rain Game’, in H. Folmer and E. van Ierland (eds), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Chapter 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 231–52

2. Scott Barrett (1994), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements’, Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on Environmental Economics, 46, October, 878–94

3. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), ‘Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment’, Journal of Public Economics, 52 (3), October, 309–28

4. Michael Hoel (1992), ‘International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 2 (2), March, 141–59

5. Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens (1997), ‘The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities’, International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (3), October, 379–401

PART II TECHNICAL ADVANCES
6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (2006), ‘Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach’, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (2), May, 247–63

7. Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2006), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited’, Oxford Economic Papers, 58 (2), April, 233–63

8. Larry Karp and Leo Simon (2013), ‘Participation Games and International Environmental Agreements: A Non-Parametric Model’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65 (2), March, 326–44

9. Carsten Helm (2001), ‘On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a Coalitional Game with Externalities’, International Journal of Game Theory, 30 (1), September, 141–6


PART III COMPLIANCE
10. Rögnvaldur Hannesson (1997), ‘Fishing as a Supergame’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32 (3), March, 309–22

11. Michael Finus and Sigve Tjøtta (2003), ‘The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap Forward?’ Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9–10), September, 2031–48

12. Henk Folmer, Pierre v. Mouche and Shannon Ragland (1993), ‘Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 3 (4), August, 313–35

13. Anke Gerber and Philipp C. Wichardt (2009), ‘Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions’, Journal of Public Economics, 93 (3–4), April, 429–39

14. Todd L. Cherry and David M. McEvoy (2013), ‘Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 54 (1), January, 63–77

15. David M. McEvoy and John K. Stranlund (2009), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (4), April, 491–508

16. Nori Tarui, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky and Greg Ellis (2008), ‘Cooperation in the Commons with Unobservable Actions’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (1), January, 37–51

17. Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner (2009) ‘A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71 (2), August, 187–209

PART IV NEGOTIATIONS, SECOND-BEST DESIGNS AND INSTITUTIONS
18. Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen (1998), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control’, Public Choice, 96 (1–2), July, 145–86

19. Scott Barrett (2002), ‘Consensus Treaties’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158 (4), December, 529–47

20. Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer (2012), ‘Environmental Cooperation: Ratifying Second-Best Agreements’, Public Choice, 151 (3–4), June, 565–84

21. A. Caparrós, J.-C. Péreau and T. Tazdaït (2004), ‘North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information’, Public Choice, 121 (3–4), December, 455–80

22. Alejandro Caparrós and Jean-Christophe Péreau (2013), ‘Forming Coalitions to Negotiate North–South Climate Agreements’, Environment and Development Economics, Special Issue on Strategic Behaviour and Environmental Commons, 18 (1), February, 69–92

23. Bård Harstad (2012), ‘Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations’, Review of Economic Studies, 79 (4), October, 1527–57

24. Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori and Sonia Oreffice (2009), ‘Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (3), March, 411–25

25. Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas Lange and Bodo Sturm (2014), ‘Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods’, Economica, 81 (322), April, 257–75

26. Scott Barrett (2006), ‘Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technologies’, American Economic Review, 96 (2), May, 22–5

27. Michael Hoel and Aart de Zeeuw (2010), ‘Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 47 (3), November, 395–406

PART V TRANSFERS, SHARING AND FAIRNESS
28. Matthew McGinty (2007), ‘International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Nations’, Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (1), January, 45–62

29. Hans-Peter Weikard (2009), ‘Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule’, Manchester School, 77 (5), September, 575–93

30. Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), ‘Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements’, Review of International Organizations, 1 (4), December, 379–96

31. Matthew McGinty, Garrett Milam and Alejandro Gelves (2012), ‘Coalition Stability in Public Goods Provision: Testing an Optimal Allocation Rule’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 52 (3), July, 327–45

32. Stefan Ambec and Yves Sprumont (2002), ‘Sharing a River’, Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2), December, 453–62

33. Andreas Lange and Carsten Vogt (2003), ‘Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity’, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9–10), September, 2049–67

34. Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl (2009), ‘Institution Formation in Public Goods Games’, American Economic Review, 99 (4), September, 1335–55

PART VI MULTIPLE COALITIONS
35. Francesco Bosello, Barabara Buchner and Carlo Carraro (2003), ‘Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2–3), April–May, 601–11

36. Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), ‘Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making’, Natural Resource Modeling, 19 (3), September, 323–58

37. Geir B. Asheim, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi and Fredric C. Menz (2006), ‘Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51 (1), January, 93–109

PART VII UNCERTAINTY, RISK AND CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
38. Seong-lin Na and Hyun Song Shin (1998), ‘International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty’, Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (2), April, 173–85

39. Michael Finus and Pedro Pintassilgo (2013), ‘The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements’, Journal of Public Economics, 103, July, 29–43

40. Alfred Endres and Cornelia Ohl (2001), ‘International Environmental Cooperation in the One Shot Prisoners' Dilemma’, Schmollers Jahrbuch, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften/Journal of Applied Social Science Studies, 121 (1), 1–26

41. Vincent Boucher and Yann Bramoullé (2010), ‘Providing Global Public Goods under Uncertainty’, Journal of Public Economics, 94 (9–10), October, 591–603

42. Scott Barrett (2013), ‘Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66 (2), September, 235–50

43. Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis and Andreas Löschel (2011), ‘Inequality, Communication, and The Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change in a Public Goods Game’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108 (29), July, 11825–9

44. Lata Gangadharan and Veronika Nemes (2009) ‘Experimental Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty in Provisioning Private and Public Goods’, Economic Inquiry 47 (1), January, 146–64

PART VIII DYNAMIC COALITION FORMATION
45. Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2007), ‘An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54 (3), November, 296–310

46. Aart de Zeeuw (2008), ‘Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (2), March, 163–74

47. Marc Germain, Philippe Toint, Henry Tulkens and Aart de Zeeuw (2003), ‘Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28 (1), October, 79–99

48. Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink and Ekko van Ierland (2010), ‘Renegotiations in the Greenhouse’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (4), April, 573–96

49. Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour (2010), ‘A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (1), January, 25–48

Index