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Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

Edited by Jac C. Heckelman, Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University, US and Nicholas R. Miller, Research Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, US
This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.
Extent: 424 pp
Hardback Price: $225.00 Web: $202.50
Publication Date: 2016
ISBN: 978 1 78347 072 3
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Political Economy
  • Public Choice Theory
  • Politics and Public Policy
  • Political Economy
  • Public Choice
This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Each chapter presents an expository primer on a particular topic or theme within social choice, with the aim of making the material fully accessible to students and scholars in economics, political science, mathematics, philosophy, law and other fields of study. Topics covered include preference aggregation, voting rules, spatial models, methodology and empirical applications.

Scholars, graduate students and even advanced undergraduates in a variety of disciplines will find this introductory and relatively non-technical book an indispensable addition to the field.
‘Social choice theory is a branch of economics and political science that examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into social choices. Heckelman and Miller have designed and edited a superb overview of the field. . . . readers who see an up-to-date, thorough, and nuanced understanding of the field will find the book invaluable.’
– R. E. O'Connor, Choice

‘This Handbook is a timely addition to the public/social choice literature. The editors have assembled an impressive list of authors who have contributed chapters covering a wide expanse of the literature starting with Iain McLean’s chapter, which traces the public choice literature from Aristotle to the present, followed by surveys of recent developments like Keith L. Dougherty’s excellent chapter on voting rules, and the equally fine chapter by Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole on measuring ideology in Congress. Indeed, all contributions are of uniformly high quality. This Handbook is a welcome addition to my bookshelf.’
– Dennis Mueller, University of Vienna, Austria

‘This book gives a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the rapidly expanding field of social choice and voting. Written in a non-technical style by a group of leading experts in the field, it makes a perfect reference book for scholars and students. The authors and editors are to be congratulated for making relatively complex ideas accessible even to readers with no background in the theory of voting. This makes the volume suitable not only for classroom use, but also for independent study.’
– Hannu Nurmi, University of Turku, Finland
Contributors: J.F. Adams, W.T. Bianco, A. Blais, P.J. Coughlin, K.L. Dougherty, D.S. Felsenthal, T.H. Hammond, C. Hare, J.C. Heckelman, R.G. Holcombe, C. Kam, M.M. Kaminski, M. Machover, B.C. McCannon, I. McLean, N.R. Miller, S. Moser, E.M. Penn, K.T. Poole, R. Ragan, D.G. Saari, I. Sened, R.A. Smyth, N. Tideman





Contents:

1. Introduction: Issues in Social Choice and Voting
Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller

PART I PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CHOICE
2. The Strange History of Social Choice
Iain McLean

3. Unanimous Consent and Constitutional Economics
Randall G. Holcombe

4. Rational Choice and the Calculus of Voting
André Blais

5. Computational Social Choice
Robi Ragan

PART II PAIRWISE SOCIAL CHOICE
6. Majority Rule and Tournament Solutions
Scott Moser

7. Supermajority Rules
Keith L. Dougherty

8. The Measurement of a Priori Voting Power
Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

9. Condorcet Jury Theorems
Bryan C. McCannon

PART III SPATIAL MODELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
10. The Spatial Model of Social Choice and Voting
Nicholas R. Miller

11. A Unified Spatial Model of American Political Institutions
Thomas H. Hammond

12. Competing for Votes
James F. Adams

13. Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition
Peter J. Coughlin

PART IV SOCIAL CHOICE FROM MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES
14. Arrow’s Theorem and Its Descendants
Elizabeth Maggie Penn

15. Properties and Paradoxes of Common Voting Rules
Jac C. Heckelman

16. Voting Mysteries: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words
Donald G. Saari

17. Multiple-Winner Voting Rules
Nicolaus Tideman

PART V EMPIRICAL SOCIAL CHOICE
18. Measuring Ideology in Congress
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole

19. The Uncovered Set and its Applications
William T. Bianco, Christopher Kam, Itai Sened and Regina A. Smyth

19. Empirical Examples of Voting Paradoxes
Marek M. Kaminski

Index