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Independent Central Banks And Economic Performance

The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series
Edited by Sylvester Eijffinger, Professor of Economics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands and CEPR
This volume contains a collection of the most important articles on independent central banks and economic performance. The collection is comprehensive and divided into four parts: theoretical foundation of central banks independence, central bank independence, empirical evidence on central bank independence and determinants of central bank independence. The editor has prepared a new introduction discussing the main developments in this field. The volume will be a basic reference source for professors, lecturers, researchers, central bankers and other policy makers interested in studying the fundamental articles on central bank autonomy.
Extent: 680 pp
Hardback Price: £206.00 Online: £185.40
Publication Date: 1997
ISBN: 978 1 85898 447 6
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Financial Economics and Regulation
This volume contains a collection of the most important articles on independent central banks and economic performance. The collection is comprehensive and divided into four parts: theoretical foundation of central banks independence, central bank independence, empirical evidence on central bank independence and determinants of central bank independence. The editor has prepared a new introduction discussing the main developments in this field. The volume will be a basic reference source for professors, lecturers, researchers, central bankers and other policymakers interested in studying the fundamental articles on central bank autonomy.
23 articles, dating from 1977 to 1995
Contributors include: A. Alesina, R.J. Barro, A. Cukierman, S. Fischer, V. Grilli, F.W. Kydland, M.J.M. Neumann, K. Rogoff, L.H. Summers, G. Tabellini
Contents: Part I: Theoretical Foundations of Central Bank Independence Part II: Measures of Central Bank Independence Part III: Empirical Evidence on Central Bank Independence Part IV: Determinants of Central Bank Independence Index