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Learning in Labour Markets

Edited by Michael Waldman, Charles H. Dyson Professor in Management and Professor of Economics, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, US
Learning in labour markets is a key feature concerning how labour markets operate. This single volume collection brings together classic and important recent contributions by leading scholars concerning how firms learn about worker abilities and other worker attributes. Topics covered include; theory of symmetric learning, evidence of symmetric learning and evidence from asymmetric learning.

With an original introduction by the editor this volume will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, libraries, and graduate students.
Extent: 992 pp
Hardback Price: $540.00 Web: $486.00
Publication Date: 2017
ISBN: 978 1 78643 122 6
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Labour Economics
  • Social Policy and Sociology
  • Labour Policy
Learning in labour markets is a key feature concerning how labour markets operate. This single volume collection brings together classic and important recent contributions by leading scholars concerning how firms learn about worker abilities and other worker attributes. Topics covered include; theory of symmetric learning, evidence of symmetric learning and evidence from asymmetric learning.

With an original introduction by the editor this volume will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, libraries, and graduate students.
‘Any scholar interested in career patterns of employees in organizations should consult this collection. It combines in one volume a comprehensive collection of seminal articles in economics that analyze the processes of learning about employees‘ talents and its implications for educational choices, promotion decisions and salary structures in firms. It demonstrates how powerful microeconomic analysis has become to help us develop a precise understanding of careers within and across organizations.’
– Dirk Sliwka, University of Cologne, Germany
35 articles, dating from 1973 to 2016
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, J. Altonji, E. Fama, H. Farber, R. Gibbons, B. Holmstrom, L. Katz, E. Lazear, P. Milgrom, M. Spence
Contents:

Introduction Michael Waldman

PART I CLASSICS
1. Michael Spence (1973), ‘Job Market Signaling’, 87 (3), Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 355–74

2. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), ‘Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover’, Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 1, October, 972–90

3. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288–307

4. Michael Waldman (1984), ‘Job Assignments, Signaling and Efficiency’, Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (2), Summer, 255-67

5. Bruce C. Greenwald (1986), ‘Adverse Selection in the Labour Market’, Review of Economic Studies, 53 (3), July, 325-47

6. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), ‘Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective’, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), January, 169-82

PART II EDUCATION
7. John G. Riley (1979), ‘Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis,’ Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 2: Education and Income, October, S227–S252

8. Kevin Lang and David Kropp (1986), ‘Human Capital Versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (3), August, 609–24

9. Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon (1987), ‘Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (1), February, 175–7

10. Kelly Bedard (2001),’Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts’, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (4), 749–75

11. Fabian Lange (2007), ‘The Speed of Employer Learning’, Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (1), 1–35

12. Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer and Aurel Hizmo (2010), ‘Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability,’ American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (4), October, 76–104

PART III THEORY OF SYMMETRIC LEARNING
13. Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom (1982), ‘A Theory of Wage Dynamics’, Review of Economic Studies, 49 (3), July, 315–33

14. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), ‘A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (4), November, 1321–358

15. Jaime Ortega (2001), ‘Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism’, Management Science, 47 (10), October, 1361–70

16. Edward P. Lazear (2004), ‘The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline’, Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1) Part 2, S141–S163

PART IV EVIDENCE ON SYMMETRIC LEARNING
17. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1992), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), June, 468–505

18. Curtis J. Simon and John T. Warner (1992), ‘Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings and Tenure’, Journal of Labor Economics, 10 (3), July, 306–30

19. Henry S. Farber and Robert Gibbons (1996), ‘Learning and Wage Dynamics’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (4), November, 1007–47

20. Joseph G. Altonji and Charles R. Pierret (2001), ‘Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 313–50

21. Lisa B. Kahn and Fabian Lange (2014) ‘Employer Learning, Productivity, and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures’, Review of Economic Studies, 81, 1575–613

22. Amanda Pallais (2014), ‘Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets’, American Economic Review, 104 (11), 3565–99

23. Jeanine Miklós-Thal and Hannes Ullrich (2016), ‘Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer’, Management Science, 62 (6), 1645–67

PART V THEORY OF ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
24. Paul Milgrom and Sharon Oster (1987), ‘Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII (3), August, 453–76

25. James D. Montgomery (1991), ‘Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis’, American Economic Review, 81, (5), December, 1408–418

26. Dan Bernhardt (1995) ‘Strategic Promotion and Compensation’, Review of Economic Studies, 62 (2), April, 315–39

27. Chun Chang and Yijiang Wang (1996), ‘Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited ’, Journal of Labor Economics, 14 (3), July, 505–19

28. Ján Zábojník and Dan Bernhardt (2001), ‘Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation’, Review of Economic Studies, 68 (3), 693–716

29. Hideo Owan (2004), ‘Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-Sponsored Training’, Journal of Labor Economics, 22 (4), October, 955–78

PART VI EVIDENCE FROM ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
30. Robert Gibbons and Lawrence F. Katz (1991), ‘Layoffs and Lemons’, Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (4), October, 351–80

31. Daron Acemoglu and Jorn -Steffen Pischke (1998) ‘Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1), February, 79–119

32. Uta Schönberg (2007), ‘Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning’, Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (4), October, 651–91

33. Joshua C. Pinkston (2009), ‘A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications’, Review of Economic Studies, 76 (1), January, 367–94

34. Jed DeVaro and Michael Waldman (2012), ‘The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence’, Journal of Labor Economics, 30 (1), January, 91–147

35. Lisa B. Kahn (2013), ‘Asymmetric Information Between Employers’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5 (4), October, 165–205

Index