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Public Choice And Public Law

Economic Approaches to Law series
Edited by Daniel A. Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law and Chair of the Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, US
Public choice theory has become an increasingly significant aspect of public law scholarship. A more comprehensive knowledge of public institutions and their activities can illuminate our understanding of how legal rules shape the behavior of these institutions. This volume gathers together key papers highlighting the fundamental issues in the evolution of this subject.
Extent: 512 pp
Hardback Price: £147.00 Online: £132.30
Publication Date: 2007
ISBN: 978 1 84542 716 0
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Law and Economics
  • Public Choice Theory
  • Law - Academic
  • Law and Economics
  • Politics and Public Policy
  • Public Choice
Public choice theory has become an increasingly significant aspect of public law scholarship. A more comprehensive knowledge of public institutions and their activities can illuminate our understanding of how legal rules shape the behavior of these institutions. This volume gathers together key papers highlighting the fundamental issues in the evolution of this subject.

Besides providing an appreciation of the institutional complexity and potential weak points of democracies, public choice theory promises to show how political structures and processes shape outcomes for better or for worse. It thereby aids understanding and improvements to institutional design. Much of that design is expressed in the form of law, so the subject is of particular importance to legal scholars. This authoritative selection of articles provides a firm foundation to this important area of study.
‘Dan Farber has assembled a diverse and challenging set of readings that lay out the grounds of agreement and disagreement in theories of public choice and law. This collection will be valuable to students and others seeking an introduction to this difficult and contentious subject.’
– John Ferejohn, Stanford University and New York University, US
13 articles, dating from 1971 to 2005
Contributors include: F. Easterbrook, W. Eskridge, W. Landis, M. McCubbins, R. Noll, R. Posner, K. Shepsle, G. Stigler, B. Weingast
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Daniel A. Farber

PART I INTEREST GROUP THEORIES
1. George J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’
2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ’The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’
3. Einer R. Elhauge (1991), ‘Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?’

PART II INSTITUTIONALIST AND AGENCY THEORIES
4. Tom Ginsburg (2002), ‘Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship’
5. Keith Krehbiel (2004), ‘Legislative Organization’
6. Daryl J. Levinson (2005), ‘Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law’

PART III PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
7. Jerry L. Mashaw (1985), ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions’
8. McNollgast (1999), ‘The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act’
9. Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell (1999), ‘The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action’

PART IV PUBLIC CHOICE AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
10. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Statutes’ Domains’
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1988), ‘Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation’
12. Kenneth A. Shepsle (1992), ‘Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron’
13. McNollgast (1994), ‘Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation’

Name Index