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Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law

Research Handbooks in Law and Economics series
Edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, US and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, CUNY, US
One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.
Elgar original reference
Extent: 384 pp
Hardback Price: $217.00 Online: $195.30
Publication Date: 2014
ISBN: 978 1 78100 014 4
Availability: In Stock
Paperback Price: $55.00 Online: $44.00
Publication Date: August 2015
ISBN: 978 1 78347 173 7
Availability: Not yet published (pre-order)
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  • Economics and Finance
  • History of Economic Thought
  • Law and Economics
  • Methodology of Economics
  • Law - Academic
  • Law and Economics
One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.

The contributors employ a variety of economic methodologies to explore a wide range of topics, including torts, contracts, property, crime, employment, the environment, and legal procedure. This depth and breadth of scholarship reflect the continuing vitality of the economic approach to law, offering an illuminating look into the future of the field and providing inspiration and guidance for the next generation of theorists.

This timely volume will appeal to students, professors and researchers in both law and economics, particularly those with an interest in the theoretical and practical intersections of the two fields.
Contributors: L. Anderlini, M. Baker, F. Baumann, J. De Mot, B. Deporter, D. Dharmapala, W. Emons, L. Felli, C. Fluet, T. Friehe, N. Garoupa, Z. Grossman, S. Izmalkov, C. Landeo, R. McAdams, T. Miceli, M.Nikitin, J. Pincus, A. Postlewaite, R. Rabon, G. Ramello, K. Segerson, P. Shapiro, T. Tsvetanov, T. Ulen, N. Westelius, A. Wickelgren
Contents:

Introduction
Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker

1. Land Assemblage: Efficiency and Equity in Public–Private Projects
Zachary Grossman, Jonathan Pincus and Perry Shapiro

2. The Economics of Activity Levels in Tort Liability and Regulation
Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen

3. Liability versus Regulation for Product-Related Risks
Thomas J. Miceli, Rebecca Rabon and Kathleen Segerson

4. Regulation versus Liability: A Behavioral Economics Perspective
Kathleen Segerson and Tsvetan Tsventanov

5. Strict Liability When Victims Choose the Value of the Asset at Risk
Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

6. Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform Under Self-Serving Bias
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov

7. Tort Standards and Legal Expenditures: A Unified Model
Jef De Mot and Ben Depoorter

8. Litigation Success Functions
Jef De Mot

9. The Optimal Amount of Distorted Testimony When the Arbiter Can and Cannot Commit
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet

10. Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent?
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa and Richard McAdams

11. Search, Seizure, and False (?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies When Police Can Plant Evidence
Dhammika Dharmapala and Thomas J. Miceli

12. Crime, Expectations, and the Deterrence Hypothesis
Matthew J. Baker and Niklas J. Westelius

13. Active Courts and Menu Contracts
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite

14. The Efficiency of Affirmative Action with Purely Historical Discrimination
Abraham L. Wickelgren

15. The Multi-layered Action of Trademark: Meaning, Law and Market
Giovanni B. Ramello