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THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING

The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series
Edited by Robert D. Tollison, Professor of Economics, Clemson University, US and Roger D. Congleton, BB&T Professor of Economics, West Virginia University, US
This collection brings together the classic papers on the economics of rent seeking. These papers date from Gordon Tullock’s original 1967 paper which first put forth the idea that the pursuit of transfers was socially costly. Other classic papers by Anne Krueger and Richard Posner are included, as well as a series of more recent papers which trace the evolution of the literature on this important innovation in economic theory.
Extent: 424 pp
Hardback Price: £180.00 Online: £162.00
Publication Date: 1995
ISBN: 978 1 85898 005 8
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Public Choice Theory
  • Politics and Public Policy
  • Public Choice
  • Public Policy
This collection brings together the classic papers on the economics of rent seeking. These papers date from Gordon Tullock’s original 1967 paper which first put forth the idea that the pursuit of transfers was socially costly. Other classic papers by Anne Krueger and Richard Posner are included, as well as a series of more recent papers which trace the evolution of the literature on this important innovation in economic theory.
‘All in all, this book is a must for anyone with interests in this area.’
– Vani Borooah, The Economic Journal
Contributors: J.N. Bhagwati, W.A. Brock, R.A. Brecher, J.M. Buchanan, W.J. Corcoran, W.R. Dougan, R.S. Higgins, A.L. Hillman, E.L. Katz, A.O. Krueger, D.W. Laband, N.V. Lany, B.G. Linster, S.P. Magee, K.M. Murphy, R.A. Posner, C.K. Rowley, A. Schleifer, J.P. Sophocleus, T.N. Srinivasan, J.M. Synder, W.F. Shughart, G.A. Tullock, R.W. Vishny, N. Vousden, R.E. Wagner, L. Young
INTRODUCTION

PART I

CLASSIC PAPERS

1. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’
2. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking society’
3. Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’
4. James M. Buchanan (1980), ‘Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking’
5. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1982), ‘Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’
6. Robert D. Tollison (1982), ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’
7. Roger Congleton (1980), ‘Competitive Procedd, Competitive Waste, and Institutions’

PART II

RENT SEEKING IN THE LONG RUN

8. Gordon Tullock (1980), ‘Efficient Rent Seeking’
9. William J. Corcoran (1984), ‘Long-run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-seeking’
10. Richard S. Higgins, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison (1985), ‘Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking’
11. Gordon Tullock (1985), ‘Back to the Bog’
12. Bruce G. Linster (1993), ‘Stackelberg Rent-seeking’
13. William R. Doudan and James M. Snyder (1993), ‘Are Rents Fully Dissipated?’

PART III

REFINEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE THEORY OF RENT SEEKING

14. Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock and Leslie Young (1989), ‘Black Hole Tariffs’
15. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Richard A. Brecher and T. N. Srinivasan (1984), ‘DUP Activities and Economic Theeory’
16. Ayre L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz (1984), ‘Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power’
17. Ngo Van Long and neil Vousden (1987), ‘Risk-Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents’
18. Roger D. Congleton (1991), ‘Ideological Conviction and Persuasion in the Rent-seeking Society’

PART IV

CONTRIBUTIONS TO MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATION

19. James M. Buchanen (1980), ‘Rent Seeking under External Diseconomies’
20. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1991), ‘The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth’
21. David W. Laband and John PO. Sophocleus (1992), ‘An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Acitivity in the United States’
22. Richard S. Higgins and Robert D. Tollison (1988), ‘Life Amongst the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking’
23. Roger D. Congleton (1988), ‘Evaluating Rent-seeking Losses: Do the Welfare Gains of Lobbyists Count?’
24. James M. Buchanen (1980), ‘Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society’
25. Robert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wagner (1991), ‘Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform’