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The New Institutional Economics Of Markets

The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series
Edited by Eirik G. Furubotn, Texas A&M University, US and University of Saarland, Germany and Rudolf Richter, University of Saarland, Germany
To date, the formulation of a systematic theory of the organization of markets has proved to be a difficult task and remains unfinished. Nevertheless, explanations do exist as to why, under given conditions, the basic activities of trade are organized in one particular fashion rather than another. This invaluable collection of essays brings together important papers by authors working in the tradition of the new institutional economics. The editors have provided an original introduction which presents a comprehensive overview of their selection.
Extent: 688 pp
Hardback Price: £246.00 Online: £221.40
Publication Date: 2010
ISBN: 978 1 84720 983 2
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Industrial Economics
  • Institutional Economics
  • Law and Economics
  • Law - Academic
  • Law and Economics
To date, the formulation of a systematic theory of the organization of markets has proved to be a difficult task and remains unfinished. Nevertheless, explanations do exist as to why, under given conditions, the basic activities of trade are organized in one particular fashion rather than another. This invaluable collection of essays brings together important papers by authors working in the tradition of the new institutional economics. The editors have provided an original introduction which presents a comprehensive overview of their selection.

The volume is an essential source of reference and an excellent resource for economists, students of public policy, sociologists, political scientists and legal analysts.
23 articles, dating from 1962 to 2002
Contributors include: A.A. Alchian, P. Bernholz, H. Demsetz, A. Greif, B. Klein, P.R. Milgrom, D.C. North, J.M. Podolny, V. Smith, O.E. Williamson
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter

PART I PRECONTRACTUAL ACTIVITIES: SEARCH AND INSPECTION
1. James M. Acheson (1985), ‘The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy’
2. Yoram Barzel (1982), ‘Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets’
3. Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein (1983), ‘The Economics of Block Booking’
4. Phillip Nelson (1974), ‘Advertising as Information’
5. Joel M. Podolny (1993), ‘A Status-based Model of Market Competition’
6. Walter W. Powell (1990), ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’

PART II CONTRACTING: PRICE AND CONTRACT FORMATION
7. Dennis W. Carlton (1986), ‘The Rigidity of Prices’
8. Harold Demsetz (1969), ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’
9. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1987), ‘Reflections on the Theory of the Firm’
10. Armen A. Alchian (1965), ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’
11. Ian R. Macneil (1978), ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’
12. Vernon L. Smith (1962), ‘An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior’
13. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’

PART III POSTCONTRACTUAL ACTIVITIES: EXECUTION, CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT
14. David P. Baron (2002), ‘Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community of Traders’
15. Peter Bernholz (1993), ‘Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets: Comment’
16. Avner Greif (1993), ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’
17. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R.Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’
19. Anthony T. Kronman (1985), ‘Contract Law and the State of Nature’
20. John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff (2000), ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’
21. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs ’
22. L.G. Telser (1980), ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements’
23. Barry R. Weingast (1993), ‘Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets’

Name Index