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The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from Imports

Critical Perspectives on the Global Trading System and the WTO series
Edited by Chad P. Bown, The World Bank, US
Temporary protection from fairly traded imports under the World Trade Organization (WTO) typically refers to a national government's use of a ‘safeguard’ tariff, quota or tariff rate quota. Safeguard provisions allow a WTO member’s national government to investigate whether a domestic industry is injured because of fairly traded, but imported goods; and then impose a temporary unilateral import restriction that would otherwise be in violation of market access commitments. This book presents some of the key theoretical and empirical research articles in the economics, legal and policy literature examining the structure and use of such temporary import protection programmes.
Extent: 552 pp
Hardback Price: £157.00 Online: £141.30
Publication Date: 2006
ISBN: 978 1 84542 254 7
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • International Economics
  • Law - Academic
Temporary protection from fairly traded imports under the World Trade Organization (WTO) typically refers to a national government's use of a ‘safeguard’ tariff, quota or tariff rate quota. Safeguard provisions allow a WTO member’s national government to investigate whether a domestic industry is injured because of fairly traded, but imported goods; and then impose a temporary unilateral import restriction that would otherwise be in violation of market access commitments. This book presents some of the key theoretical and empirical research articles in the economics, legal and policy literature examining the structure and use of such temporary import protection programmes.

This insightful collection will be an important reference source for economists and researchers interested in international trade policy and the rules of the underlying WTO system.
‘This is a much-needed collection of important theoretical and empirical papers by distinguished writers in the field on the legal, economic and political justifications for the controversial use of WTO Safeguard Mechanisms. The introduction by Chad Bown, a well-respected analyst of this subject, provides a cogent summary of the context and critical areas of this debate. As well as being an essential reference tool, this volume provides a fertile source for future research and will be of great use to academics, students and policymakers interested in the political economy of international trade and protection.’
– Robert Read, Lancaster University Management School, UK
22 articles, dating from 1976 to 2005
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, R.E. Baldwin, J. Bhagwati, D.A. Irwin, J.H. Jackson, R. McCulloch, T.J. Prusa, R.W. Staiger, A.O. Sykes, G. Tabellini
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Chad P. Bown
PART I HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS
1. John H. Jackson (1997), ‘Safeguards and Adjustment Policies’
2. Alan V. Deardorff (1987), ‘Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function’
3. J. Michael Finger (2002), ‘Safeguards: Making Sense of GATT/WTO Provisions Allowing for Import Restrictions’
PART II ECONOMIC THEORY: DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING THE CASE FOR IMPORT-RESTRICTING SAFEGUARD POLICIES
4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1976), ‘Market Disruption, Export Market Disruption, Compensation and GATT Reform’
5. Michael Mussa (1978), ‘Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model’
6. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), ‘Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection’
PART III ECONOMIC THEORY: SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS AND DESIGN
7. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), ‘A Theory of Managed Trade’
8. Ronald D. Fischer and Thomas J. Prusa (2003), ‘WTO Exceptions as Insurance’
9. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2005), ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade / World Trade Organization Escape Clause’
PART IV ECONOMIC THEORY: SAFEGUARDS AND ‘ADJUSTMENT’
10. Kaz Miyagiwa and Yuka Ohno (1995), ‘Closing the Technology Gap Under Protection’
11. Arye L. Hillman (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives’
12. S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited’
13. Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz (2004), ‘An Overlapping-generations Model of Escape Clause Protection’
PART V EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SAFEGUARDS
14. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), ‘Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy’
15. James C. Hartigan, Philip R. Perry and Sreenivas Kamma (1986), ‘The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach’
16. Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall (1994), ‘An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases’
17. Wendy L. Hansen and Thomas J. Prusa (1995), ‘The Road Most Taken: The Rise of Title VII Protection’
18. Chad P. Bown (2004), ‘Trade Disputes and the Implementation of Protection Under the GATT: An Empirical Assessment’
19. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1999), ‘Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?’
20. Chad P. Bown and Rachel McCulloch (2004), ‘The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: An Empirical Analysis of Discriminatory Impact’
PART VI POLICY USE, LEGAL PROCESS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
21. Douglas A. Irwin (2003), ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases’
22. Alan O. Sykes (2003), ‘The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence’
Name Index