This book asks under which conditions cooperation is in the interest of the riparian countries sharing international waters, and how institutions must be designed to realize potential gains of cooperation.
The author, Ines Dombrowsky, develops a conceptual framework that draws upon different economic theories, including the theory of external effects, non-cooperative game theory and transaction costs economics. She distinguishes the different types of externality problems inherent in international water management and specifies the institutional prerequisites for cooperation. She argues that the respective problems differ with respect to the need to define property rights and to establish enforcement mechanisms. The book also explores the role of issue linkage and of international organizations to foster cooperation. The theoretic considerations are compared and contrasted with the findings of a global review of international water treaties and organizations.
By taking hydrological and legal aspects into account, this book provides an interdisciplinary contribution at the interface of hydrology, law and economics. As such, it is addressed to scholars, practitioners and policy-makers, including economists, political scientists, international lawyers, natural scientists, and water resource managers.