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Corruption and Economic Development

Edited by Jayasri Dutta, Professor of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK and Toke S. Aidt, University Senior Lecturer, University of Cambridge, UK
Corruption is an almost universal and persistent feature of the modern state. Commentators primarily view corruption as a major obstacle to development, whereas dissenting voices claim that corruption has the power to facilitate trade that would otherwise not have taken place. This comprehensive collection presents the most significant works contributing to our understanding of this debate, focusing on the key conceptual and theoretical issues and discussing anti-corruption policies. Alongside an original introduction by the editors, this collection is a highly valuable asset to scholars and academics alike.
Extent: 832 pp
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Publication Date: 2016
ISBN: 978 1 78347 120 1
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  • Development Studies
  • Development Economics
  • Development Studies
  • Economics and Finance
  • Development Economics
  • Economic Crime and Corruption
Corruption is an almost universal and persistent feature of the modern state. Commentators primarily view corruption as a major obstacle to development, whereas dissenting voices claim that corruption has the power to facilitate trade that would otherwise not have taken place. This comprehensive collection presents the most significant works contributing to our understanding of this debate, focusing on the key conceptual and theoretical issues and discussing anti-corruption policies. Alongside an original introduction by the editors, this collection is a highly valuable asset to scholars and academics alike.
‘The distinctive feature of this new collection of articles on corruption and development is its coverage of the recent empirical literature, which is where most of the notable research advances in the area have occurred over the past decade. The editors provide a thoughtful assessment of the theoretical literature and how it connects with the emerging empirical contributions.’
– Dilip Mookherjee, Boston University, US
33 articles, dating from 1964 to 2015
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, T. Aidt, A. Dreher, J. Dutta, P-G. Meon, B.A. Olken, M. Paldam, M. Shleifer, D. Triesman, T. Verdier
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Jayasri Dutta and Toke Aidt

PART I SURVEYS
1. Pranab Bardhan (1997), ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV (3), September, 1320–46

2. Jakob Svensson (2005), ‘Eight Questions about Corruption’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3), Summer, 19–42, A1–A3

3. Toke S. Aidt (2003), ‘Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey’, Economic Journal, 113 (491), November, F632–F652

4. Vito Tanzi (1998), ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’, IMF Staff Papers, 45 (4), December, 559–94

PART II MEASUREMENT
5. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006), ‘Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data’, in Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Chapter 2, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 52–104

6. James E. Foster, Andrew W. Horowitz and Fabio Méndez (2012), ‘An Axiomatic Approach to the Measurement of Corruption: Theory and Applications’, World Bank Economic Review, 26 (2), June, 217–35

7. Benjamin A. Olken (2009), ‘Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality’, Journal of Public Economics, 93 (7-8), August, 950–64

8. Axel Dreher, Christos Kotsogiannis and Steve McCorriston (2007), ‘Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (3), September, 443–66

PART III THEORY
9. Francis T. Lui (1985), ‘An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery’, Journal of Political Economy, 93 (4), August, 760–81

10. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), ‘Corruption’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3), August, 599–617

11. Toke S. Aidt and Jayasri Dutta (2008), ‘Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Democracy’, Economics and Politics, 20 (3), November, 335–60

12. Christopher Bliss and Rafael Di Tella (1997), ‘Does Competition Kill Corruption?’, Journal of Political Economy, 105 (5), October, 1001–23

13. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’, Journal of Legal Studies, 3 (1), January, 1–18

14. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181–214

15. Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier (2000) ‘The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption’, American Economic Review, 90 (1), March, 194–211

16. Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene (1990), ‘How Corruption May Corrupt’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13 (1), 63–76

17. Theo Eicher, Cecilia García-Peñalosa and Tanguy van Ypersele (2009), ‘Education, Corruption, and the Distribution of Income’, Journal of Economic Growth, 14 (3), September, 205–31

18. Bård Harstad and Jakob Svensson (2011), ‘Bribes, Lobbying, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 105 (1), February, 46–63

PART IV CROSS NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
19. Daniel Treisman (2007), ‘What Have We Learned About the Causes Of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?’, Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211–44

20. Sascha O. Becker, Peter H. Egger and Tobias Seidel (2009), ‘Common Political Culture: Evidence on Regional Corruption Contagion’, European Journal of Political Economy, 25 (3), September, 300–10

21. Nauro F. Campos and Francesco Giovannoni (2007), ‘Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence’, Public Choice, 131 (1-2), April, 1–21

PART V EVIDENCE ON THE CORRUPTION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
22. Paolo Mauro (1995), ‘Corruption and Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), August, 681–712

23. Nathaniel H. Leff (1964), ‘Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption’, American Behavioral Scientist, 8 (3), November, 8–14

24. Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Laurent Weill (2010), ‘Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?’, World Development, 38 (3), March, 244–59

25. Martin Paldam (2002), ‘The Cross-Country Pattern of Corruption: Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics’, European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (2), June, 215–40

26. Toke Aidt, Jayasri Dutta and Vania Sena (2008), ‘Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (2), June, 195–220

27. Erich Gundlach and Martin Paldam (2009), ‘The Transition of Corruption: From Poverty to Honesty’, Economics Letters, 103 (3), June, 146–8

PART VI LAB, FIELD AND QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
28. Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2004), ‘Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), May, 679–705

29. Benjamin A. Olken (2007), ‘Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (2), April, 200–49

30. Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel (2007), ‘Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1020–48

31. Abigail Barr and Danila Serra (2010), ‘Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis’, Journal of Public Economics, 94 (11–12), December, 862–69

32. Ritwik Banerjee, Tushi Baul and Tanya Rosenblat (2015), ‘On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector’, Economics Letters, 127, February, 43–6

33. Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan (2008), ‘Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2), May, 703–45

Index