Print page

Design of Constitutions

Edited by Stefan Voigt, Director, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Germany
Almost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content. The contributions assembled in this volume go one step further: they ask how the knowledge gained over the last number of years can usefully be applied to constitutional design. This new branch could also be termed applied constitutional economics. Along with an original introduction, Professor Voigt has compiled a valuable research collection that will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in this growing field.
Extent: 780 pp
Hardback Price: $438.00 Web: $394.20
Publication Date: 2013
ISBN: 978 0 85793 790 2
Availability: In Stock
$0.00

Buy the E-Book @ paperback price

Join our mailing list

  • Economics and Finance
  • Law and Economics
  • Law - Academic
  • Law and Economics
Almost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content. The contributions assembled in this volume go one step further: they ask how the knowledge gained over the last number of years can usefully be applied to constitutional design. This new branch could also be termed applied constitutional economics. Along with an original introduction, Professor Voigt has compiled a valuable research collection that will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in this growing field.
‘This particular work presents – in one handy and copiously footnoted hardback volume – no less than 23 of the most authoritative and ground-breaking essays and articles currently available on this relatively new avenue of economic and legal research, published by a judicious selection of the world’s top universities. . . If you’re a lawyer, economic adviser, policy maker, student or academic, you should acquire this book.’
– Phillip Taylor MBE and Elizabeth Taylor, The Barrister Magazine
23 articles, dating from 1995 to 2010
Contributors include: B. Ackerman, A. Alesina, R. Congleton, T. Ginsburg, D. Mueller, T. Persson, D. Rubinfeld, G. Tabellini, B. Weingast
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Stefan Voigt

PART I GETTING STARTED: STATE OF THE ART AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
1. Dennis C. Mueller (2005), ‘Constitutional Political Economy in the European Union’
2. Donald L. Horowitz (2002), ‘Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes’
3. Arend Lijphart (2002), ‘The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy’

PART II THE RELEVANCE OF PROCEDURE FOR …
4. Jon Elster (1995), ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’
5. Stefan Voigt (2004), ‘The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice—Towards a Comparative Analysis’
6. John M. Carey (2009), ‘Does It Matter How a Constitution Is Created?’
7. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount (2009), ‘Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?’

PART III BASIC RIGHTS
8. Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt (2007), ‘The Economic Effects of Human Rights’
9. Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan (2008), ‘Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice’

PART IV STATE ORGANIZATION
A ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
10. Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2007), ‘Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies’
11. Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010), ‘Endogenous Constitutions’

B FORM OF GOVERNMENT
12. Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997), ‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’
13. Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi (2004), ‘Endogenous Political Institutions’

C THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATURE: BICAMERALISM
14. Roger D. Congleton (2006), ‘On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Intragovernmental Bargaining and Policy Stability’
15. Cecilia Testa (2010), ‘Bicameralism and Corruption’

D FEDERALISM
16. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr and Barry R. Weingast (2005), ‘Self-Enforcing Federalism’
17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2005), ‘Federalism and the Democratic Transition: Lessons from South Africa’

E DIRECT DEMOCRACY
18. Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (2006), ‘Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution’
19. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt (2009), ‘The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment’

PART V BEYOND CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
20. Bruce Ackerman (2000), ‘The New Separation of Powers’
21. Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger (2002), ‘Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers’
22. Tom Ginsburg (2006), ‘Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law’
23. Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume (2007), ‘Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence – the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’