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Economics of Public International Law

Edited by Eric A. Posner, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, US
This major book – edited by a leading authority – presents a careful selection of papers which analyse international law from a rational choice perspective. Interdisciplinary in scope, it includes work by professors in law, political science and economics. It addresses the proposition that states act rationally and behave in ways that are in the interest of their populations or internal groups. Topics include international adjudication, human rights law, compliance with international law, sanctions and
international legal responsibility.
Extent: 648 pp
Hardback Price: $351.00 Web: $315.90
Publication Date: 2010
ISBN: 978 1 84542 708 5
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Law and Economics
  • Law - Academic
  • Law and Economics
  • Public International Law
This major book – edited by a leading authority – presents a careful selection of papers which analyse international law from a rational choice perspective. Interdisciplinary in scope, it includes work by professors in law, political science and economics. It addresses the proposition that states act rationally and behave in ways that are in the interest of their populations or internal groups. Topics include international adjudication, human rights law, compliance with international law, sanctions and
international legal responsibility.

The book will be an essential source of reference for scholars and students working in international law, international relations and related fields.
14 articles, dating from 1992 to 2007
Contributors include: K. Abbott, J. Eaton, J.L. Goldsmith, A. Guzman, R. Keohane, G. Maggi, F. Parisi, T. Sandler, B. Simmons, A. Sykes
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Eric A. Posner

PART I COMPLIANCE
1. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner (1999), ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’
2. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’

PART II TREATIES
3. Oona A. Hathaway (2002), ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’
4. Francesco Parisi and Catherine Ševčenko (2003), ‘Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention’
5. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons (2006), ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000’

PART III INSTITUTIONS
6. Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal (2000), ‘The Concept of Legalization’
7. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), ‘The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms’
8. Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo (2005), ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’
9. Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli (2006), ‘Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations’
10. Alan O. Sykes (2005), ‘Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy’
11. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2007), ‘An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law’

PART IV SECURITY
12. Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers (1992), ‘Sanctions’
13. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (2001), ‘Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action’
14. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2005), ‘Optimal War and Jus ad Bellum’