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Economics of Tort Law

Edited by Alan O. Sykes, Stanford Law School, Stanford University, US
This two-volume collection, prepared by a leading scholar in this field, brings together the seminal articles on the law and economics of tort law. The selection of papers addresses topics such as the Coase theorem, the choice between property and liability rules, the difference between negligence and strict liability, the economics of causation, damages and vicarious liability and the economics of affirmative duties. This is a classic collection that provides an essential foundation in the core issues fundamental to an understanding of tort law.
Two volume set
Extent: 1,360 pp
Hardback Price: $714.00 Web: $642.60
Publication Date: 2007
ISBN: 978 1 84542 454 1
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Law and Economics
  • Law - Academic
  • Commercial Law
  • Law and Economics
  • Law of Obligations
This two-volume collection, prepared by a leading scholar in this field, brings together the seminal articles on the law and economics of tort law. The selection of papers addresses topics such as the Coase theorem, the choice between property and liability rules, the difference between negligence and strict liability, the economics of causation, damages and vicarious liability and the economics of affirmative duties. This is a classic collection that provides an essential foundation in the core issues fundamental to an understanding of tort law.
‘Over the past half century, the law and economics movement has profoundly influenced the foundations of intellectual thought about tort law. In the Economics of Tort Law, Professor Alan Sykes has collected and edited a sparkling array of contributions to this literature, which clearly indicates both the depth and the breadth of this important interdisciplinary enterprise.’
– Robert L. Rabin, Stanford Law School, US
34 articles, dating from 1960 to 2005
Contributors include: G. Calabresi, R. Coase, W. Landes, A.M. Polinsky, R. Posner, S. Shavell, W.K. Viscusi
Contents:

Volume I

Acknowledgements

Introduction Alan O. Sykes

PART I LIABILITY RULES, PROPERTY RULES, REGULATION AND THE COASE THEOREM
1. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
2. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’
3. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’
4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety’

PART II NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
5. Richard A. Posner (1972), ‘A Theory of Negligence’
6. Richard A. Epstein (1973), ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’
7. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’
8. Steven Shavell (1980), ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’
9. A. Mitchell Polinsky (1980), ‘Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting’
10. Mark F. Grady (1983), ‘A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence’
11. John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell (1984), ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards’

PART III CAUSATION
12. Guido Calabresi (1975), ‘Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.’
13. Steven Shavell (1980), ‘An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts’
14. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1983), ‘Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach’
15. Marcel Kahan (1989), ‘Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule’

PART IV COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
16. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1988), ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’,
18. W. Kip Viscusi (2000), ’The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique’

Name Index


Volume II

Acknowledgements

An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE MULTIPLIER PRINCIPLE
1. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1998), ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade (1998), ‘Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)’
3. Richard Craswell (1999), ‘Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives’
4. Keith N. Hylton and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?’

PART II VICARIOUS LIABILITY
5. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1982), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents’
6. Alan O. Sykes (1984), ‘The Economics of Vicarious Liability’
7. Alan O. Sykes (1988), ‘The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines’

PART III AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
8. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1978), ‘Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism’
9. Saul Levmore (1986), ‘Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations’

PART IV MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS
10. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis’
11. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘On Liability and Insurance’
12. Patricia M. Danzon (1985), ‘Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice’
14. W. Bishop (1982), ‘Economic Loss in Tort’
15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts’
16. Patricia Munch Danzon (1983), ‘Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation’

Name Index