The Conceptual Structure of EU Competition Law

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The Conceptual Structure of EU Competition Law

Restrictive Agreements

9781035311835 Edward Elgar Publishing
Csongor István Nagy, Professor of Law, University of Galway, Ireland; Professor of Law, University of Szeged and Research Professor, HUN-REN Center for Social Sciences, Hungary
Publication Date: October 2024 ISBN: 978 1 03531 183 5 Extent: c 272 pp
This is an Open Access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. It is free to read, download and share on Elgaronline, thanks to generous funding support from the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary and the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

The Conceptual Structure of EU Competition Law provides a systematic overview of the key theoretical issues of restrictive agreements, by means of doctrinal analysis and comparative law. Engaging in both positivist and evaluative approaches, Csongor Istvan Nagy conceptualizes case-law in practical terms, outlining its paradigmatic changes and apparent contradictions.

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The Conceptual Structure of EU Competition Law provides a systematic overview of the key theoretical issues of restrictive agreements, by means of doctrinal analysis and comparative law.

Engaging in both positivist and evaluative approaches, Csongor István Nagy conceptualizes the case-law in practical terms, outlining its paradigmatic changes and apparent contradictions. Chapters explore the purpose of competition law and the structure of competition analysis; the categories of anticompetitive object; the delimitation of object and non-object agreements; the borderline and recently emerged or emerging categories; the analytical framework of effects-analysis; and the consideration of general societal values. Nagy proposes key amendments, such as a balanced approach to formalism and substantiveness, a consistent concept of anticompetitive object, a sliding scale approach to effects-analysis, and a structuralist construction for exemption.

This book is an essential resource for academics and students in competition and antitrust law and European law. Its analysis of critical case-laws is also invaluable to legal professionals and practitioners in the field.
Critical Acclaim
‘This is a remarkable study that explores deeply key fundamental notions of EU Antitrust Law, that have been particularly at the forefront of controversies as of late. It is based on extensive study of foreign and domestic doctrine and comparative law. This analysis provides a great insight into the various dimensions of the anticompetitive nature of restrictive agreements, making this a valuable addition to any EU Antitrust library.’
– Miguel Sousa Ferro, University of Lisbon Law School, Portugal

‘This is an excellent and important addition to the academic literature on EU competition law. It provides a clearly-structured, succinct, well-drafted and knowledgeable analysis of the role of the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 as part of the fuller framework of antitrust rules, a parallel account to the excellent work of Ibanez-Colomo on the modernisation of Article 102. This book will be critical reading for all competition law scholars and practitioners and provide an effective source for the study of competition law at advanced and Masters levels.’
– Barry Rodger, University of Strathclyde, UK

‘The book draws extensively on U.S. antitrust law to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating restrictive agreements under EU competition law. Of particular interest is the author’s discussion of the various pigeonholes that are used in evaluating restrictive agreements under Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act, including “the per se rule” and rule of reason and various hybrids such as the “quick look.” Readers will be particularly interested in the author’s distinction between the “quick look” and the “abbreviated rule of reason.”’
– George A. Hay, Cornell Law School, US
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