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Governance and Executive Compensation

Edited by William Forbes, Professor of Accounting and Finance, School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, UK
This timely volume is an authoritative selection of the most important papers investigating the complex and controversial issue of governance and executive compensation. Professor Forbes includes seminal material on the history, rationale and prospects for executive pay and its impact upon corporate performance. He has also written a new original introduction to each section explaining the contribution of each paper. This landmark book will be an essential source of reference for an understanding of executive pay and its relationship to business success.
Extent: 552 pp
Hardback Price: $317.00 Web: $285.30
Publication Date: 2011
ISBN: 978 1 84844 201 6
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  • Business and Management
  • Corporate Governance
  • Economics and Finance
  • Corporate Governance
  • Law - Academic
  • Corporate Law and Governance
This timely volume is an authoritative selection of the most important papers investigating the complex and controversial issue of governance and executive compensation. Professor Forbes includes seminal material on the history, rationale and prospects for executive pay and its impact upon corporate performance. He has also written a new original introduction to each section explaining the contribution of each paper. This landmark book will be an essential source of reference for an understanding of executive pay and its relationship to business success.
19 articles, dating from 1988 to 2009
Contributors include: M. Conyon, J. Core, M. Jensen, K. Murphy, C. Prendergast
Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction William Forbes

PART I MANAGERIAL PAY: BECAUSE THEY’RE WORTH IT?
1. Martin J. Conyon (2006), ‘Executive Compensation and Incentives’
2. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How’
3. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2006), ‘Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues’

PART II STOCK OPTIONS AS A DEVICE TO INCENTIVISE MANAGERS TO MAXIMISE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
4. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and David F. Larcker (2003), ‘Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey’
5. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2003), ‘The Trouble with Stock Options’
6. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), ‘Stock Options for Undiversified Executives’

PART III MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE AND PAY: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRADE-OFF
7. Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick (1999), ‘The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation’
8. John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay (2002), ‘The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation: A Revised Comment’
9. Canice Prendergast (2002), ‘The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives’

PART IV EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE NEW ECONOMY
10. Kevin J. Murphy (2003), ‘Stock-based Pay in New Economy Firms’
11. James C. Sesil, Maya K. Kroumova, Joseph R. Blasi and Douglas L. Kruse (2002), ‘Broad-based Employee Stock Options in US “New Economy” Firms’
12. Christopher D. Ittner, Richard A. Lambert and David F. Larcker (2003), ‘The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms’

PART V THE BACKDATING OF STOCK OPTIONS
13. Erik Lie (2005), ‘On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards’
14. Jesse M. Fried (2008), ‘Option Backdating and Its Implications’
15. Gennaro Bernile and Gregg A. Jarrell (2009), ‘The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders’

PART VI GREED AND FEAR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXECUTIVE PAY
16. Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III and James Wade (1995), ‘The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives’
17. Charles A. O’Reilly III, Brian G. Main and Graef S. Crystal (1988), ‘CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories’
18. Stuart Ogden and Robert Watson (2008), ‘Executive Pay and the Search for Legitimacy: An Investigation into How UK Remuneration Committees Use Corporate Performance Comparisons in Long-Term Incentive Pay Decisions’
19. Chip Heath, Steven Huddart and Mark Lang (1999), ‘Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise’