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Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II

Applications Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Extent: 552 pp
Hardback Price: $330.00 Web: $297.00
Publication Date: 2018
ISBN: 978 1 78811 277 2
Availability: In Stock
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Econometrics
  • Game Theory
  • Industrial Economics
  • Industrial Organisation
Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others.

This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development.

Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory.
‘The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.’
– From the Foreword by Eric Maskin

‘With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. They have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had, and continues to have, on the field of industrial organization over recent years. Any serious researcher wanting to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider studying the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.’
– David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France
Contributors: S.P. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L.C. Corchón, A.F. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Faulí‐Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M. González‐Maestre, Á. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. López, M.A. Marini, C. Marvão, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, J. Potters, J.F. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota‐Graziosi, J. Sandonís, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo
Contents:

Foreword by Eric Maskin

1. Introduction
Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini

PART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS
2. Horizontal mergers in oligopoly
Ramon Faulí‐Oller and Joel Sandonis

3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets
Marco A. Marini

4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt
Catarina Marvão and Giancarlo Spagnolo

5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger cases
Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta

PART II CONTESTS
6. Contest theory
Luis C. Corchón and Marco Serena

7. Endogenous timing in contests
Magnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi

PART III SPECIAL TOPICS
8. Firm pricing with consumer search
Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault

9. Market structure, liability, and product safety
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly
Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino

11. Platforms and network effects
Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz

12. Auctions
Ángel Hernando-Veciana

13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economics
Luca Lambertini

14. Intellectual property
Miguel González‐Maestre

15. Healthcare and health insurance markets
Pau Olivella

16. The microeconomics of corruption
Roberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and José G. Montalvo

PART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
17. Experimental industrial organization
Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters

18. Empirical models of firms’ R&D
Andrés Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno

Index