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Negotiating Environmental Quality

Policy Implementation in Germany and the United States Markus A. Lehmann, Economic Advisor, Social, Economic and Legal Affairs, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme, Canada
Using strategic game theory, this innovative book carefully reviews the detailed negotiations between industry, regulating agencies, and third parties in environmental policy implementation. The analysis is underpinned by an institutional comparison of German and American administrative and environmental law.

After presenting an alternative model to address real-world bargaining, Markus Lehmann provides an economic rationale for the use of case-to-case regulation, a policy instrument traditionally neglected if not rejected by environmental economists. He discusses how and to what extent the shortcomings of this instrument can be overcome by a specific institutional design. He presents a clear-cut policy conclusion which is shown to be quite robust under different model structures and varying sets of assumptions.
Extent: 264 pp
Hardback Price: $155.00 Web: $139.50
Publication Date: 2000
ISBN: 978 1 85898 976 1
Availability: In Stock
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Using strategic game theory, this innovative book carefully reviews the detailed negotiations between industry, regulating agencies and third parties in environmental policy implementation. The analysis is underpinned by an institutional comparison of German and US administrative and environmental law.

After presenting an alternative model to address real-world bargaining, Markus Lehmann provides an economic rationale for the use of case-to-case regulation, a policy instrument traditionally neglected if not rejected by environmental economists. He discusses how and to what extent the shortcomings of this instrument can be overcome by a specific institutional design. He presents a clear-cut policy conclusion which is shown to be quite robust under different model structures and varying sets of assumptions.

This pathbreaking study will be essential reading for economists studying environmental economics and political economy, political scientists working on policy implementation and design, as well as lawyers interested in administrative law and standing, and the economic theory of the law.
Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Discretion, Agency Control and Judicial Review in Germany and the United States 3. Standing, Collusion and Collusion Deterrence 4. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Asymmetrical Standing 5. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Symmetrical Standing 6. Negotiations under Uncertain Court Outcomes: Incomplete Information 7. Conclusions References Index