Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications brings together an impressive collection of Charles R. Plott’s work in experimental economics.
The papers in this volume represent the beginnings of Professor Plott’s experimental research on public economics, public choice and political processes, which are the origin for experimental work in mechanism design and experimental testbeds. He addresses the problems related to committees and public choice institutions, and develops methodological foundations that were later exported to other areas of economics. In these groundbreaking experiments strategies for posing questions are developed. The fundamental principles that shape policy studies are discovered and refined.
The volume goes on to apply the principles to the prediction of group choice using game theory and voting theory, the power of special institutions and processes to determine outcomes, and the concept of equilibrium and equilibration in decision processes.
Finally, the papers reflect a maturing of the methodologies, devoting attention to their success in the area of institutional design in general and of policy in particular.
With deep roots in problems related to policy analysis that are carried throughout the volume, Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications will be a fascinating read for those with an interest in experimental economics, the methodology of economics, political theory, and political economy.