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Trust

Edited by Elias L. Khalil, Associate Professor, Monash University, Australia
Trust is an authoritative collection of previously published articles and is unique in the growing literature on trustworthiness. The broad ranging articles are organized into three parts, expressing three definite answers to the question posed in the introduction: Why does trustworthiness pay? Part I, ‘Trust as Strategy’, stipulates that trust is an investment in reputation. Part II, ‘Trust as Taste’, argues that agents have a preference for trustworthiness, which may explain the anomaly of trustworthiness in single-shot games. Part III, ‘Trust as Trait’, maintains that trust is a trait that evolutionary selection may favor. In his extensive introductory essay, Elias Khalil elaborates and contrasts the strengths and weaknesses of each answer.
Extent: 808 pp
Hardback Price: $420.00 Web: $378.00
Publication Date: 2003
ISBN: 978 1 84064 737 2
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  • Economics and Finance
  • Industrial Economics
  • Industrial Organisation
Trust is an authoritative collection of previously published articles and is unique in the growing literature on trustworthiness. The broad ranging articles are organized into three parts, expressing three definite answers to the question posed in the introduction: Why does trustworthiness pay? Part I, ‘Trust as Strategy’, stipulates that trust is an investment in reputation. Part II, ‘Trust as Taste’, argues that agents have a preference for trustworthiness, which may explain the anomaly of trustworthiness in single-shot games. Part III, ‘Trust as Trait’, maintains that trust is a trait that evolutionary selection may favor. In his extensive introductory essay, Elias Khalil elaborates and contrasts the strengths and weaknesses of each answer.

Including over 35 articles from diverse disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology, and organizational studies, Trust will be a valuable reference for many years to come.
‘It is big, diverse and, through its organization coherent. This truly is an encyclopedia of trust research. . . warmly recommended.’
– D.J. Bezemer, Journal of Socio-Economics

‘This is a splendid collection of leading papers on a topic which properly is getting increasing attention.’
– Howard Margolis, University of Chicago, US

‘This is an excellent, comprehensive collection of essays on a subject of great importance – trust is a pervasive indispensable element of social cooperation, yet difficult to fit into the conventional categories of economic analysis. This book, with its fine introduction by the editor, anchors the subject and will be the starting point for further research into it.’
– Richard A. Posner, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and University of Chicago Law School, US
36 articles, dating from 1977 to 2001
Contributors include: G. Akerlof, R. Axelrod, E. Fehr, D. Kahneman, M. Rabin, R. Selten, A. Sen, G. Tullock, B. Weingast, O. Williamson
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Why Does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers Elias L. Khalil
PART I TRUST AS STRATEGY
1. Gordon Tullock (1985), ‘Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’
2. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion (1988), ‘The Further Evolution of Cooperation’
3. Jack Hirshleifer (1999), ‘There are Many Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation’
4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’
5. David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’
6. John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson (1995), ‘Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game’
7. Edward H. Lorenz (1988), ‘Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry’
8. Keith Hart (1988), ‘Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum’
9. Peter Kollock (1994), ‘The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust’
10. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
11. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’
12. Bart Nooteboom (1996), ‘Trust, Opportunism and Governance: A Process and Control Model’
13. Bernd Lahno (2001), ‘On the Emotional Character of Trust’
PART II TRUST AS TASTE
14. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000), ‘Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity’
15. Werner Güth and Reinhard Tietz (1990), ‘Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results’
16. Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991), ‘Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study’
17. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001), ‘In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies’
18. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments’
19. Richard H. Thaler with Robyn M. Dawes (1992), ‘Cooperation’
20. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History’
21. Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing (2000), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination’
22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’
23. George A. Akerlof (1982), ‘Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange’
24. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’
25. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’
26. Amitai Etzioni (1986), ‘The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception’
27. Amartya K. Sen (1977), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’
28. Elias L. Khalil (1999), ‘Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen’s Notion of Commitment’
PART III TRUST AS TRAIT
29. Ulrich Witt (1986), ‘Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts’
30. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg (2000), ‘Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust’
31. Werner Güth and Menahem E. Yaari (1992), ‘Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach’
32. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’
33. Robert H. Frank (1987), ‘If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?’
34. Jack Hirshleifer (1987), ‘On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises’
35. Jörn P.W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), ‘The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face’
36. Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten (2000), ‘An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining’
Name Index