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Designing Financial Supervision Institutions

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Designing Financial Supervision Institutions

Independence, Accountability and Governance

9781847202161 Edward Elgar Publishing
Edited by Donato Masciandaro, Full Professor of Economics and Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation, Bocconi University, Italy and Marc Quintyn, Division Chief, International Monetary Fund’s Institute, US
Publication Date: 2007 ISBN: 978 1 84720 216 1 Extent: 528 pp
This book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions.

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This book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions.

For a long time the design of supervision had been an irrelevant issue, both in theory and practice. This perception changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, and over the past decade many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of financial supervision. This book presents frameworks for analyzing the emerging supervisory architectures and sheds light on the different supervisory regimes, with a particular focus on the role of central banks. It takes a country-specific, comparative and empirical approach.

Designing Financial Supervision Institutions will be an accessible reference tool for multidisciplinary scholars and academics (principally economics, but also politics and law), policymakers, regulators and supervisory institutions.

All royalties from this book to go to the UK charity, NSPCC.
Critical Acclaim
‘This is a collection of essays written by eminent economists and policy studies scholars. . . this is a useful book in its presentation of empirical research to policymakers, lawyers and economists on a subject of immense interest and currency.’
– Jason Chuah, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation

‘The volume is rich in information on the design of financial supervisory institutions around the globe, includes interesting analytical work and provides a structured discussion of the relevant policy issues. Researchers and policymakers in the field of financial regulation and supervision will find it useful.’
– SUERF
Contributors
Contributors: A. Alesina, M. Arnone, L. Bini Smaghi, M. Čihák, S.M. Darbar, G. Di Giorgio, C. Di Noia, R.A. Eisenbeis, A. Freytag, A. Gambini, C. Goodhart, D. Masciandaro, M. Nieto, R. Podpiera, H. Prast, M. Quintyn, S. Ramirez, G. Tabellini, M.W. Taylor, J. Westrup
Contents
Contents:

Foreword
Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn

Introduction
Charles Goodhart

PART I: INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE
1. Robust Regulators and their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory
Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor

2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European Setting
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor

4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics Matters
Jonathan Westrup

5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and Practices
Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini

PART II: THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS
6. Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank Independence
Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro

7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision
Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini

8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision
Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera

9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models
Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia

10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A Primer
Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast

PART III: IN SEARCH OF THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
11. Bureaucrats or Politicians?
Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini

12. Agency Problems in Banking Supervision
Robert A. Eisenbeis

Index
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