Game Theory and International Relations
Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence
Edited by Pierre Allan, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland and Christian Schmidt, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Dauphine, France

At the cutting edge of current modelling in international relations using non-cooperative game theory, this collection of original contributions from political scientists and economists explores some of the fundamental assumptions of game theory modelling. It includes a theory of game payoff formation, a theory of preference aggregation, thorough discussions of the effects of interdependence between preferences upon various game structures, in-depth analyses of the impact of incomplete information upon dynamic games of negotiation, and a study using differential games. Numerous illustrations, case studies and comparative case studies show the relevance of the theoretical debate. The chapters are organised to allow readers with a limited knowledge of game theory to develop their understanding of the fundamental issues.

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