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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
Experimental economics is a rapidly growing and influential branch of the discipline. In this two volume set the editors have bought together nine topics, including methodological concerns, preference reversals, willingness to pay and willingness to accept, bargaining and auctions, which illustrate the progress made in this area and the current state of play. For each topic they have selected a series of important previously published papers, to which they have added an editorial commentary that sets them in context and indicates which directions future experimental work on these topics might most profitably take.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
Experimental economics is a rapidly growing and influential branch of the discipline. In this two volume set the editors have bought together nine topics, including methodological concerns, preference reversals, willingness to pay and willingness to accept, bargaining and auctions, which illustrate the progress made in this area and the current state of play. For each topic they have selected a series of important previously published papers, to which they have added an editorial commentary that sets them in context and indicates which directions future experimental work on these topics might most profitably take.
Critical Acclaim
‘This collection would be ideal as reading material for a graduate-level course in experimental economics.’
– Robert Sugden, The Economic Journal
– Robert Sugden, The Economic Journal
Contributors
Contributors include: C.F. Camerer, R.G. Hansen, J.H. Kagel, D. Kahneman, C.R. Plott, A.E. Roth, V.L. Smith
Contents
VOLUME 1
PART 1
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
1. Alvin E. Roth (1988), ‘Laboratory Experimentation in Economics; A Methodological Overview’
2. Vernon L. Smith (1982), ‘Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science’
3. James M. Walker, Vernon L. Smith and James C. Cox (1990), ‘Inducing Risk-Neutral Preferences: An Examination in a Controlled Market Environment’
4. Glenn W. Harrison (1989), ‘Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions’
PART 2
PREFERENCE REVERSALS
5. David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979), ‘Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon’
6. Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990), ‘The Causes of Preference Reversal’
7. Graham Loomes, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1991), ‘Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods’
PART 3
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT
8. Jack L Knetsch and J A Sinden (1984), ‘Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value’
9. Don L Coursey, John L Hovis and William D Schulze (1987), ‘The Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value’
10. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch and Richard H Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
PART 4
EXPECTED UTILITY AND GENERALIZATIONS
11. Colin F. Camerer (1989), ‘An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories’
12. Raymond C Battalio, John H. Kagel and Komain Jiranyakul (1990), ‘Testing Between Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results’
13. Don N. MacDonald, John H. Kagel and Raymond C. Battalio (1991), ‘Animals’ Choices Over Uncertain Outcomes: Further Experimental Results’
PART 5
GAMES
14. Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker (1986), ‘End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach’
15. Colin Camerer and Keith Weigelt (1988), ‘Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model’
16. Russell W. Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1990), ‘Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results’
VOLUME 2
PART 1
BARGAINING
1. Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze (1982), ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’
2. K.Binmore, A. Shaked and J. Sutton (1985), ‘Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study’
3. Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth (1989), ‘An Experimental Study of Sequential bargaining’
4. Vesna Prasnikar and Alvin E. Roth (1992), ‘Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games’
PART 2
AUCTIONS
5. Vicki M. Coppinger, Vernon L. Smith and Jon A. Titus (1980), ‘Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions’
6. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1986), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions’
7. Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1989), ‘A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis’
8. Barry Lind and Charles R. Plott (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers’
9. Robert G.Hansen and John R. Lott, Jr. (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment’
10. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply’
PART 3
11. Charles R. Plott (1983), ‘Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets’
12. Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E. E. Rutström and Matthew Spitzer (1987), ‘Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Markets’
13. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Why Free Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments’
PART 4
MARKETS
14. Vernon L.Smith, Gerry L.Suchanek and Arlington W. Williams (1988), ‘Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets’
15. Charles R.Plott and Glen George (1992), ‘Marshallian vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market’
16. Colin F. Camerer (1987), ‘Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets?: Experimental Evidence’
17. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Martin Weber (1989), ‘The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis’
18. Robert Forsythe and Russell Lundholm (1990), ‘Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market’
19. Shyam Sunder (1992), ‘Market for Information: Experimental Evidence’
PART 1
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
1. Alvin E. Roth (1988), ‘Laboratory Experimentation in Economics; A Methodological Overview’
2. Vernon L. Smith (1982), ‘Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science’
3. James M. Walker, Vernon L. Smith and James C. Cox (1990), ‘Inducing Risk-Neutral Preferences: An Examination in a Controlled Market Environment’
4. Glenn W. Harrison (1989), ‘Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions’
PART 2
PREFERENCE REVERSALS
5. David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979), ‘Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon’
6. Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990), ‘The Causes of Preference Reversal’
7. Graham Loomes, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1991), ‘Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods’
PART 3
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT
8. Jack L Knetsch and J A Sinden (1984), ‘Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value’
9. Don L Coursey, John L Hovis and William D Schulze (1987), ‘The Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value’
10. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch and Richard H Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
PART 4
EXPECTED UTILITY AND GENERALIZATIONS
11. Colin F. Camerer (1989), ‘An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories’
12. Raymond C Battalio, John H. Kagel and Komain Jiranyakul (1990), ‘Testing Between Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results’
13. Don N. MacDonald, John H. Kagel and Raymond C. Battalio (1991), ‘Animals’ Choices Over Uncertain Outcomes: Further Experimental Results’
PART 5
GAMES
14. Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker (1986), ‘End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach’
15. Colin Camerer and Keith Weigelt (1988), ‘Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model’
16. Russell W. Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1990), ‘Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results’
VOLUME 2
PART 1
BARGAINING
1. Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze (1982), ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’
2. K.Binmore, A. Shaked and J. Sutton (1985), ‘Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study’
3. Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth (1989), ‘An Experimental Study of Sequential bargaining’
4. Vesna Prasnikar and Alvin E. Roth (1992), ‘Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games’
PART 2
AUCTIONS
5. Vicki M. Coppinger, Vernon L. Smith and Jon A. Titus (1980), ‘Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions’
6. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1986), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions’
7. Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1989), ‘A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis’
8. Barry Lind and Charles R. Plott (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers’
9. Robert G.Hansen and John R. Lott, Jr. (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment’
10. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1991), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply’
PART 3
11. Charles R. Plott (1983), ‘Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets’
12. Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E. E. Rutström and Matthew Spitzer (1987), ‘Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Markets’
13. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Why Free Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments’
PART 4
MARKETS
14. Vernon L.Smith, Gerry L.Suchanek and Arlington W. Williams (1988), ‘Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets’
15. Charles R.Plott and Glen George (1992), ‘Marshallian vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market’
16. Colin F. Camerer (1987), ‘Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets?: Experimental Evidence’
17. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Martin Weber (1989), ‘The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis’
18. Robert Forsythe and Russell Lundholm (1990), ‘Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market’
19. Shyam Sunder (1992), ‘Market for Information: Experimental Evidence’
