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The Elgar Companion to Public Economics
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The Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Empirical Public Economics

9781843769576 Edward Elgar Publishing
Edited by Attiat F. Ott, formerly Professor of Economics and President, Institute for Economic Policy Studies, Clark University and Richard J. Cebula, Billy J. Walker/Wells Fargo Endowed Chair of Finance, Jacksonville University, US
Publication Date: 2006 ISBN: 978 1 84376 957 6 Extent: 496 pp
Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.

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Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.

This major Companion addresses a wealth of topics common to the study of both public economics and public choice including questions such as: How does one structure the whole spectrum of public finance in a manageable framework? What is Wagner’s Law really about and what does empirical testing tell us? How binding is the budget constraint? How encompassing is a dictator’s interest? How do veto powers of the executive, institutional structures and regimes affect public sector outcomes? Do voters behave rationally? Do conflicts yield benefits? Is war cost effective and does secession offer a viable exit option?

The contributions, both theoretical and empirical, shed light on some contentious issues in the public economics literature and provide readers with insight into issues that are at the forefront of discussions about the public economy. The empirical analysis utilizes recent econometric techniques to validate or refute empirical findings based on older ‘vintage’ econometrics. The diversity of coverage ranges from traditional models of the public economy to the incorporation of defence spending as a significant and often neglected function of the public sector. The contributors include many pioneers and leading lights in the field.

The Elgar Companion to Public Economics will be required reading for academics and scholars at many levels in the fields of public economics and public choice but mainly graduate and above. The Companion will also be of value to scholars in the wider social sciences in general and political science in particular.
Contributors
Contributors: C. Alexandrakis, R. Babihuga, T. Borcherding, R.J. Cebula, R.T. Deacon, N. Devaraj, V. Dolgopolov, V. Dombrovsky, B.T. Ewing, L.P. Feld, S. Ghosh, K. Hartley, R.T. Jones, G. Kirchgässner, N. Kote, D. Lee, H. Mohammadi, R.A. Musgrave, N. Öcal, B. Orcutt, A.F. Ott, J.E. Payne, A. Peacock, R. Ram, S. Saha, D. Schap, S. Sezgin, G. Tullock, T. Woldesenbet, J. Yildirim
Contents
Contents:

Preface
Introduction and Background
Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula

Part I: The Public Economy
1. Public Finance and the Three Branch Model
Richard A. Musgrave

2. The Empirics of the Three Branch Model
Attiat F. Ott

3. Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities
Alan Peacock

4. Wagner’s Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach
James E. Payne, Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi

5. Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why?
Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj

6. Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey
Robert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha

7. Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa
Rita Babihuga

Part II: Public Sector Provision
8. The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey
Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee

9. Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods
Soma Ghosh

10. Economics of Conflict
Keith Hartley

11. Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
Rati Ram

12. The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey
Julide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir Öcal

Part III: Re-Shaping Public Sector Outcomes in a Democracy
13. Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes
Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner

14. Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit
Nirupama Devaraj

15. An Extension of the Rational Voter Model
Richard J. Cebula and Gordon Tullock

16. A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating
Richard J. Cebula

17. Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature
David Schap

18. An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto
Nevila Kote

Part IV: Models of Public Sector Behavior
19. The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation
Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott

20. The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models
Trufat Woldesenbet

21. What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith
Vjacheslav Dombrovsky

22. Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones

References
Index
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