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Handbook of Experimental Game Theory
The aim of this Handbook is twofold: to educate and to inspire. It is meant for researchers and graduate students who are interested in taking a data-based and behavioral approach to the study of game theory. Educators and students of economics will find the Handbook useful as a companion book to conventional upper-level game theory textbooks, enabling them to compare and contrast actual behavior with theoretical predictions. Researchers and non-specialists will find valuable examples of laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggest new ways of modeling strategic behavior. Chapters are organized into several sections; each section concludes with an inspirational chapter, offering suggestions on new directions and cutting-edge topics of research in experimental game theory.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory offers a comprehensive analysis of the field, discussing foundational topics that are at the core of applied game theory. It highlights the nuances that scientific experiments have delivered to our understanding of strategic interactions among decision makers.
Leading experts explore methodological considerations and games of complete and incomplete information to offer new directions for research in experimental game theory. Chapters demonstrate transformative behavioral research focused on classic topics in game theory such as cooperation and coordination games. Taking a scientific approach to the study of game theory, this innovative Handbook provides an insight into laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggests new ways of modeling strategic behavior. It takes a forward-thinking position, addressing the challenges inherent in innovations surrounding the measurement of strategic behavior using experimental methods.
This Handbook will prove to be a valuable resource for scholars and students who are looking to gain a broader understanding of experimental game theory and how to contribute to its advancement. It will also be of particular interest to researchers in experimental and behavioral economics.
Leading experts explore methodological considerations and games of complete and incomplete information to offer new directions for research in experimental game theory. Chapters demonstrate transformative behavioral research focused on classic topics in game theory such as cooperation and coordination games. Taking a scientific approach to the study of game theory, this innovative Handbook provides an insight into laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggests new ways of modeling strategic behavior. It takes a forward-thinking position, addressing the challenges inherent in innovations surrounding the measurement of strategic behavior using experimental methods.
This Handbook will prove to be a valuable resource for scholars and students who are looking to gain a broader understanding of experimental game theory and how to contribute to its advancement. It will also be of particular interest to researchers in experimental and behavioral economics.
Critical Acclaim
‘The Handbook provides a valuable service to the profession in collecting together results from many important areas within experimental economics. The Handbook succeeds in highlighting the potential of experimental economics to enrich economics and the related social/behavioral sciences.’
– Sanjit Dhami, Journal of Economic Literature
‘This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.’
– Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US
‘Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.’
– Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US
– Sanjit Dhami, Journal of Economic Literature
‘This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.’
– Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US
‘Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.’
– Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US
Contributors
Contributors: C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Bicchieri, M. Bigoni, A. Blume, S.F. Brosnan, A.L. Brown, J. Buckenmaier, G. Camera, C.M. Capra, M. Casari, M. Castillo, D.J. Cooper, G. Coricelli, R.T.A. Croson, J.K. Goeree, J. Großer, C.A. Holt, E.K. Lai, W. Lim, C. Martinelli, M. McBride, P.G. Moffatt, T.R. Palfrey, S. Pan, R. Petrie, L. Polonio, G. Ridinger, M.L. Rigdon, T.S. Rosenblat, M.F. Smith, A. Sontuoso, D.G. Stephenson, M.C. Villeval, A. Vostroknutov, J. Watzek, R.A. Weber
Contents
Contents:
Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory 1
C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat
PART I A SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
1 Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal response
equilibrium 8
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey
2 The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models 48
Peter G. Moffatt
3 The process of choice in games 69
Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov
4 Games with continuous-time experimental protocols 95
Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson
5 Bargaining in the field 125
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie
PART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
6 Recent advances in experimental coordination games 149
David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber
7 Public goods, norms and cooperation 184
Marie Claire Villeval
8 Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system 213
Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari
9 Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations 241
Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso
10 Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games 256
Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan
11 Reciprocity in games with unknown types 271
Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride
12 Behavioral rules 289
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier
PART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
13 Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoretical
foundations 311
Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim
14 Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results 348
César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey
15 Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey 376
Jens Großer
16 Experiments in market design 399
Siqi Pan
Index
Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory 1
C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat
PART I A SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
1 Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal response
equilibrium 8
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey
2 The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models 48
Peter G. Moffatt
3 The process of choice in games 69
Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov
4 Games with continuous-time experimental protocols 95
Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson
5 Bargaining in the field 125
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie
PART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
6 Recent advances in experimental coordination games 149
David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber
7 Public goods, norms and cooperation 184
Marie Claire Villeval
8 Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system 213
Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari
9 Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations 241
Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso
10 Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games 256
Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan
11 Reciprocity in games with unknown types 271
Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride
12 Behavioral rules 289
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier
PART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
13 Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoretical
foundations 311
Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim
14 Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results 348
César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey
15 Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey 376
Jens Großer
16 Experiments in market design 399
Siqi Pan
Index