Handbook of Experimental Game Theory


Handbook of Experimental Game Theory

9781785363320 Edward Elgar Publishing
Edited by C. Mónica Capra, Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Rachel T.A. Croson, College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, Mary L. Rigdon, Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University and Tanya S. Rosenblat, School of Information and Department of Economics, University of Michigan, US
Publication Date: October 2020 ISBN: 978 1 78536 332 0 Extent: c 624 pp
The aim of this Handbook is twofold: to educate and to inspire. It is meant for researchers and graduate students who are interested in taking a data-based and behavioral approach to the study of game theory. Educators and students of economics will find the Handbook useful as a companion book to conventional upper-level game theory textbooks, enabling them to compare and contrast actual behavior with theoretical predictions. Researchers and non-specialists will find valuable examples of laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggest new ways of modeling strategic behavior. Chapters are organized into several sections; each section concludes with an inspirational chapter, offering suggestions on new directions and cutting-edge topics of research in experimental game theory.

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The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory offers a comprehensive analysis of the field, discussing foundational topics that are at the core of applied game theory. It highlights the nuances that scientific experiments have delivered to our understanding of strategic interactions among decision makers.

Leading experts explore methodological considerations and games of complete and incomplete information to offer new directions for research in experimental game theory. Chapters demonstrate transformative behavioral research focused on classic topics in game theory such as cooperation and coordination games. Taking a scientific approach to the study of game theory, this innovative Handbook provides an insight into laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggests new ways of modeling strategic behavior. It takes a forward-thinking position, addressing the challenges inherent in innovations surrounding the measurement of strategic behavior using experimental methods.

This Handbook will prove to be a valuable resource for scholars and students who are looking to gain a broader understanding of experimental game theory and how to contribute to its advancement. It will also be of particular interest to researchers in experimental and behavioral economics.
Critical Acclaim
‘This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.’
– Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US

‘Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.’
– Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US
Contributors include: C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Bicchieri, M. Bigoni, A. Blume, S.F. Brosnan, A.L. Brown, J. Buckenmaier, G. Camera, C.M. Capra, M. Casari, M. Castillo, D.J. Cooper, G. Coricelli, R.T.A. Croson, J.K. Goeree, J. Großer, C.A. Holt, E.K. Lai, W. Lim, C. Martinelli, M. McBride, P.G. Moffatt, T.R. Palfrey, S. Pan, R. Petrie, L. Polonio, G. Ridinger, M.L. Rigdon, T.S. Rosenblat, A. Sontuoso, M.F. Smith, D.G. Stephenson, M.C. Villeval, A. Vostroknutov, J. Watzek, R.A. Weber

C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat

Part I A sampling of methodological innovations
1. Stochastic Game Theory for Social Science: A Primer on Quantal Response Equilibrium
Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and Thomas Palfrey

2. The Experimetrics of Depth-of-Reasoning Models
Peter G. Moffatt

3. The Process of Choice in Games
Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov

4. Games with Continuous-Time Experimental Protocols
Alexander Brown and Daniel Stephenson

5. Bargaining in the Field
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie

Part II Experiments on static and dynamic games of complete information
6. Recent Advances in Experimental Coordination Games
David Cooper and Roberto Weber

7. Public Goods, Norms and Cooperation
Marie Claire Villeval

8. Cooperation among Strangers with and without a Monetary System
Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

9. Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms: The Role of Normative Expectations
Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso

10. “Strategies Used by Non-Human Primates in Dynamic Games”
Mackenzie Smith, Julia Watzek and Sarah Brosnan

11. Reciprocity in Games with Unknown Types
Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride

12. Behavioral Rules
Carlos Alos-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier

Part III Experiments on static and dynamic games of incomplete information.
13. Strategic Information Transmission: A Survey of Experiments and Theoretical Foundations
Andreas Blume, Ernest Lai and Wooyoung Lim

14. Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results
Cesar Martinelli and Thomas Palfrey

15. Voting Game Experiments with Incomplete Information: A Survey
Jens Großer

16. “Experiments in Market Design”
Siqi Pan


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eISBN: 978 1 78536 333 7
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