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Recent Developments in Monopoly and Competition Policy
The formulation and application of competition policy presents significant challenges. These include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements. The editor has selected key papers that illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive coverage of the theory that underpins competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations. This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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Competition policy aims to prevent anticompetitive agreements and mergers, limiting the abusive exercise of market power. The formulation and application of this policy presents significant challenges, which include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements.
For this insightful volume the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations.
This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
For this insightful volume the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations.
This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
Critical Acclaim
‘. . . the collection of critical writings on recent developments in monopoly and competition provide an in-depth look at the core areas of competition in their current form and examines some of the emerging issues. Mr Norman has compiled a comprehensive set of both economic policy and econometric articles that provide the reader with modern developments in competition law and policy which are increasingly globally relevant as more and more jurisdictions join in outlawing anti-competitive conduct.’
– Bruce Lloyd and Matthew Bowman, European Competition Law Review
‘This is an outstanding collection of readings by distinguished scholars on a wide variety of competition policy issues. Students and antitrust practitioners alike will benefit by having these articles together in a single volume.’
– Michael A. Salinger, Boston University School of Management, US
– Bruce Lloyd and Matthew Bowman, European Competition Law Review
‘This is an outstanding collection of readings by distinguished scholars on a wide variety of competition policy issues. Students and antitrust practitioners alike will benefit by having these articles together in a single volume.’
– Michael A. Salinger, Boston University School of Management, US
Contributors
27 articles, dating from 1990 to 2006
Contributors include: O. Ashenfelter, J. Baker, J. Farrell, J. Kwoka, M. Motta, R. Porter, M. Slade, J. Vickers, M. Whinston
Contributors include: O. Ashenfelter, J. Baker, J. Farrell, J. Kwoka, M. Motta, R. Porter, M. Slade, J. Vickers, M. Whinston
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction George Norman
PART I SETTING THE SCENE: THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
1. Jonathan B. Baker (2003), ‘The Case for Antitrust Enforcement’
2. John Vickers (2005), ‘Abuse of Market Power’
PART II THEORY OF PRICE FIXING
3. Barbara McCutcheon (1997), ‘Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?’
4. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullen (2001), ‘Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case’
5. Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), ‘Optimal Collusion with Private Information’
6. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), ‘Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority’
PART III THE IMPACT OF PRICE FIXING
7. Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), ‘Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding’
8. John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), ‘The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction “Knockouts”’
9. John M. Connor (2001), ‘“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995’
10. Lawrence J. White (2001), ‘Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?’
PART IV CARTELS
11. George Symeonidis (2002), ‘Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms’
12. Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’
13. Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), ‘Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution’
PART V HORIZONTAL MERGERS
14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’
15. David Spector (2003), ‘Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences’
16. Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), ‘Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples’
17. Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), ‘Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits’
PART VI VERTICAL MERGERS AND FORECLOSURE
18. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’
19. Yongmin Chen (2001), ‘On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects’
20. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’
PART VII VERTICAL RESTAINTS
21. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’
22. Michael D. Whinston (2001), ‘Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know’
23. Tim R. Sass (2005), ‘The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry’
PART VIII OTHER ABUSIVE PRACTICES
24. Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), ‘Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory’
25. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’
26. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’
27. Leemore S. Dafny (2005), ‘Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction George Norman
PART I SETTING THE SCENE: THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
1. Jonathan B. Baker (2003), ‘The Case for Antitrust Enforcement’
2. John Vickers (2005), ‘Abuse of Market Power’
PART II THEORY OF PRICE FIXING
3. Barbara McCutcheon (1997), ‘Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?’
4. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullen (2001), ‘Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case’
5. Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), ‘Optimal Collusion with Private Information’
6. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), ‘Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority’
PART III THE IMPACT OF PRICE FIXING
7. Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), ‘Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding’
8. John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), ‘The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction “Knockouts”’
9. John M. Connor (2001), ‘“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995’
10. Lawrence J. White (2001), ‘Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?’
PART IV CARTELS
11. George Symeonidis (2002), ‘Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms’
12. Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’
13. Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), ‘Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution’
PART V HORIZONTAL MERGERS
14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’
15. David Spector (2003), ‘Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences’
16. Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), ‘Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples’
17. Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), ‘Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits’
PART VI VERTICAL MERGERS AND FORECLOSURE
18. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’
19. Yongmin Chen (2001), ‘On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects’
20. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’
PART VII VERTICAL RESTAINTS
21. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’
22. Michael D. Whinston (2001), ‘Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know’
23. Tim R. Sass (2005), ‘The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry’
PART VIII OTHER ABUSIVE PRACTICES
24. Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), ‘Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory’
25. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’
26. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’
27. Leemore S. Dafny (2005), ‘Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets’
Name Index
