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The Economics of Philanthropy and Fundraising
What are people buying when they give money away? Is pure altruism possible? Who benefits from grants to charities and subsidies to givers? Is religious giving different? Which fundraising approaches ‘work’, and is more charity always better? Questions like these make philanthropy and fundraising among the most dynamic research areas in economics today. Including an original introduction, this two-volume collection guides both students and scholars from the time when giving was seen as ‘irrational’, to the present when economics has fully embraced the complex and fascinating challenges of understanding why self-interested people can be so unselfish.
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Contributors
Contents
More Information
What are people buying when they give money away? Is pure altruism possible? Who benefits from grants to charities and subsidies to givers? Is religious giving different? Which fundraising approaches ‘work’, and is more charity always better? Questions like these make philanthropy and fundraising among the most dynamic research areas in economics today. Including an original introduction, this two-volume collection guides both students and scholars from the time when giving was seen as ‘irrational’, to the present when economics has fully embraced the complex and fascinating challenges of understanding why self-interested people can be so unselfish.
Contributors
67 articles, dating from 1962 to 2013
Contributors include: G. Becker, D. Bernheim, C.T. Clotfelter, P. Diamond, J. Gruber, W. Harbaugh, J. List, S. Meier, A. Payne, L. Verterlund
Contributors include: G. Becker, D. Bernheim, C.T. Clotfelter, P. Diamond, J. Gruber, W. Harbaugh, J. List, S. Meier, A. Payne, L. Verterlund
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction James Andreoni
PART I IS ALTRUISTIC GIVING A VALID TOPIC FOR ECONOMICS?
1. Kenneth E. Boulding (1962), ‘Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy’, in Frank G. Dickinson (ed.), Philanthropy and Public Policy, New York, NY: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 57–71
2. Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers (1969), ‘Pareto Optimal Redistribution’, American Economic Review, 59 (4), September, 542–57
3. Gary S. Becker (1974), ‘A Theory of Social Interactions’, Journal of Political Economy, 82 (6), November/December, 1063–93
4. Kenneth J. Arrow (1981), ‘Optimal and Voluntary Income Distribution’, in Steven Rosefielde (ed.), Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson, Chapter 10, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 267–88
PART II CROWDING-OUT AND NEUTRALITY
5. Peter G. Warr (1983), ‘The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income’, Economic Letters, 13 (2–3), 207–11
6. Russell D. Roberts (1984), ‘A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers’, Journal of Political Economy, 92 (1), February, 136–48
PART III NEUTRALITY AND ITS LIMITS
7. Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume and Hal Varian (1986), ‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods’, Journal of Public Economics, 29 (1), February, 25–49
8. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism’, Journal of Public Economics, 35 (1), February, 57–73
9. B. Douglas Bernheim (1986), ‘On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods’, American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 789–93
10. James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom (1996), ‘Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?’, Public Choice, 88 (3/4), September, 295–308
PART IV GENERALIZING ALTRUISM: WARM-GLOW GIVING
11. Robert Sugden (1984), ‘Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions’, Economic Journal, 94 (376), December, 772–87
12. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1984), ‘Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods’, Economic Journal, 94 (375), September, 580–98
13. James Andreoni (1989), ‘Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence’, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (6), December, 1447–58
14. James Andreoni (1990), ‘Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving’, Economic Journal, 100 (401), June, 464–77
15. William T. Harbaugh (1998), ‘What Do Donations Buy?: A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow’, Journal of Public Economics, 67 (2), February, 269–84
16. David C. Ribar and Mark O. Wilhelm (2002), ‘Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2), April, 425–57
PART V TESTING THEORIES OF PREFERENCES
17. James Andreoni (1993), ‘An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis’, American Economic Review, 83 (5), December, 1317–27
18. Gary E. Bolton and Elena Katok (1998), ‘An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficent Behavior’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37 (3), November, 315–31
19. James Andreoni (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness of Confusion?’, American Economic Review, 85 (4), September, 891–904
20. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), ‘Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism’, Econometrica, 70 (2), March, 737–53
21. James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (2001), ‘Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 293–312
22. Ulrich Mayr, William T. Harbaugh and Dharol Tankersley (2008), ‘Neuroeconomics of Charitable Giving and Philanthropy’, in Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr and Russell A. Poldrack (eds), Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain, Chapter 20, Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 303–20
23. Heidi Crumpler and Philip J. Grossman (2008), ‘An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving’, Journal of Public Economics, 92 (5–6), June, 1011–21
PART VI TWO VIEWS OF OPTIMAL SUBSIDIES FOR GIVING
24. Louis Kaplow (1995), ‘A Note on Subsidizing Gifts’, Journal of Public Economics, 58 (3), November, 469–77
25. Peter Diamond (2006), ‘Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences’, Journal of Public Economics, 90 (4-5), May, 897–919
PART VII THE EFFECTS OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR GIVING
26. Charles T. Clotfelter (1980), ‘Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Panel of Taxpayers’, Journal of Public Economics, 13 (3), June, 319–40
27. William C. Randolph (1995), ‘Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (4), August, 709–38
28. Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T. Clotfelter (2002), ‘Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data’, American Economic Review, 92 (1), March, 371–82
29. Gerald E. Auten, Charles T. Clotfelter and Richard L. Schmalbeck (2000), ‘Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy’, in Joel B. Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing The Rich, Chapter 12, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 392–424
30. James Andreoni, Eleanor Brown and Isaac Rischall (2003), ‘Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Decides and Why Does it Matter?’, Journal of Human Resources, XXXVIII (1), Winter, 111–33
31. Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2010), ‘Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2), May, 117–41
PART VIIIMEASURES OF CROWDING OUT
32. Eric J. Brunner (1997), ‘An Empirical Test of Neutrality and the Crowding-Out Hypothesis’, Public Choice, 92 (3/4), September, 261–79
33. A. Abigail Payne (1998), ‘Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms’, Journal of Public Economics, 69 (3), September, 323–45
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I RETHINKING CHARITY AS A STRATEGIC MARKETPLACE
1. James Andreoni (1998), ‘Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6), December, 1186–213
2. John Morgan (2000), ‘Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries’, Review of Economic Studies, 67 (4), October, 761–84
3. Lise Vesterlund (2003), ‘The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising’, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (3-4), March, 627–57
4. James Andreoni (2006), ‘Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising’, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (1), January, 1–22
5. James Andreoni and A. Abigail Payne (2003), ‘Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?’, American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 792–812
6. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1982), ‘Charitable Giving and “Excessive” Fundraising’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97 (2), May, 193–212
7. Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim (2013), ‘A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations’, American Economic Review, 103 (2), April, 1091–107
PART II EXPERIMENTS ON FUNDRAISING: LAB AND FIELD
8. John A. List and David Lucking-Reiley (2002), ‘The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (1), February, 215–33
9. James Andreoni and Ragan Petrie (2004), ‘Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse into Fund-raising’, Journal of Public Economics, 88 (7–8), July, 1605–23
10. Adriaan R. Soetevent (2005), ‘Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context – A Field Experiment in 30 Churches’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11–12), December, 2301–23
11. Jan Potters, Martin Sefton and Lise Vesterlund (2005), ‘After You – Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (8), August, 1399–419
12. Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman (2003), ‘Rebate Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?’, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (3–4), March, 681–701
13. Stephan Meier (2003), ‘Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (6), December, 1203–22
14. Dean Karlan and John A. List (2007), ‘Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment’, American Economic Review, 97 (5), December, 1774–93
15. Steffen Huck and Imran Rasul (2011), ‘Matched Fundraising: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (5–6), June, 351–62
16. Jeffrey Carpenter, Jessica Holmes and Peter Hans Matthews (2008), ‘Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment’, Economic Journal, 118 (525), January, 92–113
PART III CROWDING OUT OR CROWDING IN?
17. Stephen Coate (1995), ‘Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy’, American Economic Review, 85 (1), March, 46–57
18. Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996), ‘A Signaling Explanation for Charity’, American Economic Review, 86 (4), September, 1019–28
19. James Andreoni and A. Abigail Payne (2011), ‘Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (5-6), June, 334–43
20. David Card, Kevin F. Hallock and Enrico Moretti (2010), ‘The Geography of Giving: The Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Local Charities’, Journal of Public Economics, 94 (3-4), April, 222–34
21. Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim (2013), ‘(Un)Informed Charitable Giving’, Journal of Public Economics, 106, October, 14–26
PART IV SOCIAL EFFECTS ON CHARITABLE GIVING
22. James Andreoni and John Karl Scholz (1998), ‘An Econometric Analysis of Charitable Giving with Interdependent Preferences’, Economic Inquiry, XXXVI (3), July, 410–28
23. Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier (2004), ‘Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment’, American Economic Review, 94 (5), December, 1717–22
24. James Andreoni and B. Douglas Bernheim (2009), ‘Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects’, Econometrica, 77 (5), September, 1607–36
25. Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha and Stephan Meier (2009), ‘Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially’, American Economic Review, 99 (1), March, 544–55
26. Christina M. Fong and Erzo F.P. Luttmer (2009), ‘What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1 (2), April, 64–87
27. Jen Shang and Rachel Croson (2009), ‘A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods’, Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1422–39
28. Jonathan Meer (2011), ‘Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Pressure in Charitable Solicitation’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (7), August, 926–41
29. Stefano DellaVigna, John A. List and Ulrike Malmendier (2012), ‘Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (1), February, 1–56
PART V HIDDEN CONSEQUENCES OF AID TO CHARITIES
30. Jonathan Gruber (2004), ‘Pay or Pray? The Impact of Charitable Subsidies on Religious Attendance’, Journal of Public Economics, 88 (12), December, 2635–55
31. Daniel M. Hungerman (2005), ‘Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11), December, 2245–67
32. Carl Mellström and Magnus Johannesson (2011), ‘Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (4), June, 845–63
33. Daniel W. Elfenbein and Brian McManus (2010), ‘A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2), May, 28–60
34. Ayelet Gneezy, Uri Gneezy, Gerhard Riener and Leif D. Nelson (2012), ‘Pay-What-You-Want, Identity, and Self-Signaling in Markets’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109 (19), 7236–40
Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction James Andreoni
PART I IS ALTRUISTIC GIVING A VALID TOPIC FOR ECONOMICS?
1. Kenneth E. Boulding (1962), ‘Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy’, in Frank G. Dickinson (ed.), Philanthropy and Public Policy, New York, NY: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 57–71
2. Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers (1969), ‘Pareto Optimal Redistribution’, American Economic Review, 59 (4), September, 542–57
3. Gary S. Becker (1974), ‘A Theory of Social Interactions’, Journal of Political Economy, 82 (6), November/December, 1063–93
4. Kenneth J. Arrow (1981), ‘Optimal and Voluntary Income Distribution’, in Steven Rosefielde (ed.), Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson, Chapter 10, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 267–88
PART II CROWDING-OUT AND NEUTRALITY
5. Peter G. Warr (1983), ‘The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income’, Economic Letters, 13 (2–3), 207–11
6. Russell D. Roberts (1984), ‘A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers’, Journal of Political Economy, 92 (1), February, 136–48
PART III NEUTRALITY AND ITS LIMITS
7. Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume and Hal Varian (1986), ‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods’, Journal of Public Economics, 29 (1), February, 25–49
8. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism’, Journal of Public Economics, 35 (1), February, 57–73
9. B. Douglas Bernheim (1986), ‘On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods’, American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 789–93
10. James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom (1996), ‘Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?’, Public Choice, 88 (3/4), September, 295–308
PART IV GENERALIZING ALTRUISM: WARM-GLOW GIVING
11. Robert Sugden (1984), ‘Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions’, Economic Journal, 94 (376), December, 772–87
12. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1984), ‘Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods’, Economic Journal, 94 (375), September, 580–98
13. James Andreoni (1989), ‘Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence’, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (6), December, 1447–58
14. James Andreoni (1990), ‘Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving’, Economic Journal, 100 (401), June, 464–77
15. William T. Harbaugh (1998), ‘What Do Donations Buy?: A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow’, Journal of Public Economics, 67 (2), February, 269–84
16. David C. Ribar and Mark O. Wilhelm (2002), ‘Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2), April, 425–57
PART V TESTING THEORIES OF PREFERENCES
17. James Andreoni (1993), ‘An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis’, American Economic Review, 83 (5), December, 1317–27
18. Gary E. Bolton and Elena Katok (1998), ‘An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficent Behavior’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37 (3), November, 315–31
19. James Andreoni (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness of Confusion?’, American Economic Review, 85 (4), September, 891–904
20. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), ‘Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism’, Econometrica, 70 (2), March, 737–53
21. James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (2001), ‘Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 293–312
22. Ulrich Mayr, William T. Harbaugh and Dharol Tankersley (2008), ‘Neuroeconomics of Charitable Giving and Philanthropy’, in Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr and Russell A. Poldrack (eds), Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain, Chapter 20, Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 303–20
23. Heidi Crumpler and Philip J. Grossman (2008), ‘An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving’, Journal of Public Economics, 92 (5–6), June, 1011–21
PART VI TWO VIEWS OF OPTIMAL SUBSIDIES FOR GIVING
24. Louis Kaplow (1995), ‘A Note on Subsidizing Gifts’, Journal of Public Economics, 58 (3), November, 469–77
25. Peter Diamond (2006), ‘Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences’, Journal of Public Economics, 90 (4-5), May, 897–919
PART VII THE EFFECTS OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR GIVING
26. Charles T. Clotfelter (1980), ‘Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Panel of Taxpayers’, Journal of Public Economics, 13 (3), June, 319–40
27. William C. Randolph (1995), ‘Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (4), August, 709–38
28. Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T. Clotfelter (2002), ‘Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data’, American Economic Review, 92 (1), March, 371–82
29. Gerald E. Auten, Charles T. Clotfelter and Richard L. Schmalbeck (2000), ‘Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy’, in Joel B. Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing The Rich, Chapter 12, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 392–424
30. James Andreoni, Eleanor Brown and Isaac Rischall (2003), ‘Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Decides and Why Does it Matter?’, Journal of Human Resources, XXXVIII (1), Winter, 111–33
31. Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2010), ‘Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2), May, 117–41
PART VIIIMEASURES OF CROWDING OUT
32. Eric J. Brunner (1997), ‘An Empirical Test of Neutrality and the Crowding-Out Hypothesis’, Public Choice, 92 (3/4), September, 261–79
33. A. Abigail Payne (1998), ‘Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms’, Journal of Public Economics, 69 (3), September, 323–45
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I RETHINKING CHARITY AS A STRATEGIC MARKETPLACE
1. James Andreoni (1998), ‘Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6), December, 1186–213
2. John Morgan (2000), ‘Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries’, Review of Economic Studies, 67 (4), October, 761–84
3. Lise Vesterlund (2003), ‘The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising’, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (3-4), March, 627–57
4. James Andreoni (2006), ‘Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising’, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (1), January, 1–22
5. James Andreoni and A. Abigail Payne (2003), ‘Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?’, American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 792–812
6. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1982), ‘Charitable Giving and “Excessive” Fundraising’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97 (2), May, 193–212
7. Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim (2013), ‘A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations’, American Economic Review, 103 (2), April, 1091–107
PART II EXPERIMENTS ON FUNDRAISING: LAB AND FIELD
8. John A. List and David Lucking-Reiley (2002), ‘The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (1), February, 215–33
9. James Andreoni and Ragan Petrie (2004), ‘Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse into Fund-raising’, Journal of Public Economics, 88 (7–8), July, 1605–23
10. Adriaan R. Soetevent (2005), ‘Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context – A Field Experiment in 30 Churches’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11–12), December, 2301–23
11. Jan Potters, Martin Sefton and Lise Vesterlund (2005), ‘After You – Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (8), August, 1399–419
12. Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman (2003), ‘Rebate Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?’, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (3–4), March, 681–701
13. Stephan Meier (2003), ‘Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (6), December, 1203–22
14. Dean Karlan and John A. List (2007), ‘Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment’, American Economic Review, 97 (5), December, 1774–93
15. Steffen Huck and Imran Rasul (2011), ‘Matched Fundraising: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (5–6), June, 351–62
16. Jeffrey Carpenter, Jessica Holmes and Peter Hans Matthews (2008), ‘Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment’, Economic Journal, 118 (525), January, 92–113
PART III CROWDING OUT OR CROWDING IN?
17. Stephen Coate (1995), ‘Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy’, American Economic Review, 85 (1), March, 46–57
18. Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996), ‘A Signaling Explanation for Charity’, American Economic Review, 86 (4), September, 1019–28
19. James Andreoni and A. Abigail Payne (2011), ‘Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (5-6), June, 334–43
20. David Card, Kevin F. Hallock and Enrico Moretti (2010), ‘The Geography of Giving: The Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Local Charities’, Journal of Public Economics, 94 (3-4), April, 222–34
21. Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim (2013), ‘(Un)Informed Charitable Giving’, Journal of Public Economics, 106, October, 14–26
PART IV SOCIAL EFFECTS ON CHARITABLE GIVING
22. James Andreoni and John Karl Scholz (1998), ‘An Econometric Analysis of Charitable Giving with Interdependent Preferences’, Economic Inquiry, XXXVI (3), July, 410–28
23. Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier (2004), ‘Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment’, American Economic Review, 94 (5), December, 1717–22
24. James Andreoni and B. Douglas Bernheim (2009), ‘Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects’, Econometrica, 77 (5), September, 1607–36
25. Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha and Stephan Meier (2009), ‘Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially’, American Economic Review, 99 (1), March, 544–55
26. Christina M. Fong and Erzo F.P. Luttmer (2009), ‘What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1 (2), April, 64–87
27. Jen Shang and Rachel Croson (2009), ‘A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods’, Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1422–39
28. Jonathan Meer (2011), ‘Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Pressure in Charitable Solicitation’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (7), August, 926–41
29. Stefano DellaVigna, John A. List and Ulrike Malmendier (2012), ‘Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (1), February, 1–56
PART V HIDDEN CONSEQUENCES OF AID TO CHARITIES
30. Jonathan Gruber (2004), ‘Pay or Pray? The Impact of Charitable Subsidies on Religious Attendance’, Journal of Public Economics, 88 (12), December, 2635–55
31. Daniel M. Hungerman (2005), ‘Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11), December, 2245–67
32. Carl Mellström and Magnus Johannesson (2011), ‘Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (4), June, 845–63
33. Daniel W. Elfenbein and Brian McManus (2010), ‘A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2), May, 28–60
34. Ayelet Gneezy, Uri Gneezy, Gerhard Riener and Leif D. Nelson (2012), ‘Pay-What-You-Want, Identity, and Self-Signaling in Markets’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109 (19), 7236–40
Index
