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The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation
In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degrees of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. The fourth part of the book examines the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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This new authoritative collection comprises previously published papers on the political economy of environmental regulation: economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental regulation are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United States. Despite this geographic focus, many of the papers contain analytical models that are methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world.
In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degrees of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. The fourth part of the book examines the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation will be of significant interest to environmental scholars, students and policy makers alike.
In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degrees of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. The fourth part of the book examines the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation will be of significant interest to environmental scholars, students and policy makers alike.
Critical Acclaim
‘In this stimulating compendium, Stavins has assembled many important papers dealing with both positive and normative themes in environmental regulation. The political economy overlay is more than a convenient organizational device, since environmental regulation is both an economic challenge and a target of political opportunity.’
– Kenneth Shepsle, Harvard University, US
– Kenneth Shepsle, Harvard University, US
Contributors
22 articles, dating from 1975 to 2003
Contributors include: J.M. Buchanan, M.L. Cropper, R.W. Hahn, J.J. Hamilton, P.L. Joskow, W.E. Oates, P.R. Portney, R.L.Revesz, R. Schmalensee, M.L. Weitzman
Contributors include: J.M. Buchanan, M.L. Cropper, R.W. Hahn, J.J. Hamilton, P.L. Joskow, W.E. Oates, P.R. Portney, R.L.Revesz, R. Schmalensee, M.L. Weitzman
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Robert N. Stavins
PART I SETTING THE TARGETS AND GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
1. Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’
2. Maureen L. Cropper, William N. Evans, Stephen J. Berardi, Maria M. Ducla-Soares and Paul R. Portney (1992), ‘The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making’
3. Roger D. Congleton (1992), ‘Political Institutions and Pollution Control’
4. Andrew Metrick and Martin L. Weitzman (1996), ‘Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation’
5. James Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1997), ‘The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol’
6. Toke S. Aidt (1998), ‘Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy’
PART II CHOOSING THE INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), ‘Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes’
8. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick (1982), ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’
9. Donald N. Dewees (1983), ‘Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy’
10. Robert W. Hahn (1989), ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders’
11. James T. Hamilton (1997), ‘Taxes, Torts, and Toxics Release Inventory: Congressional Voting on Instruments to Control Pollution’
12. Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee (1998), ‘The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program’
13. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz and Robert N. Stavins (1998), ‘The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy’
14. Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1999), ‘Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation’
15. Friedrich Schneider and Juergen Volkert (1999), ‘No Chance for Incentive-oriented Environmental Policies in Representative Democracies? A Public Choice Analysis’
PART III SETTING THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT TO BE DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY
16. Per G. Fredriksson and Noel Gaston (2000), ‘Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups’
17. John A. List and Shelby Gerking (2000), ‘Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States’
18. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’
19. Per G. Fredriksson and Daniel L. Millimet (2002), ‘Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States’
PART IV ASSESSING THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
20. Robert W. Hahn (2000), ‘The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy’
21. Wallace E. Oates (2000), ‘From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics’
22. Robert W. Hahn, Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins (2003), ‘Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Robert N. Stavins
PART I SETTING THE TARGETS AND GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
1. Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’
2. Maureen L. Cropper, William N. Evans, Stephen J. Berardi, Maria M. Ducla-Soares and Paul R. Portney (1992), ‘The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making’
3. Roger D. Congleton (1992), ‘Political Institutions and Pollution Control’
4. Andrew Metrick and Martin L. Weitzman (1996), ‘Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation’
5. James Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1997), ‘The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol’
6. Toke S. Aidt (1998), ‘Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy’
PART II CHOOSING THE INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), ‘Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes’
8. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick (1982), ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’
9. Donald N. Dewees (1983), ‘Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy’
10. Robert W. Hahn (1989), ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders’
11. James T. Hamilton (1997), ‘Taxes, Torts, and Toxics Release Inventory: Congressional Voting on Instruments to Control Pollution’
12. Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee (1998), ‘The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program’
13. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz and Robert N. Stavins (1998), ‘The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy’
14. Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1999), ‘Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation’
15. Friedrich Schneider and Juergen Volkert (1999), ‘No Chance for Incentive-oriented Environmental Policies in Representative Democracies? A Public Choice Analysis’
PART III SETTING THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT TO BE DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY
16. Per G. Fredriksson and Noel Gaston (2000), ‘Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups’
17. John A. List and Shelby Gerking (2000), ‘Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States’
18. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’
19. Per G. Fredriksson and Daniel L. Millimet (2002), ‘Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States’
PART IV ASSESSING THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
20. Robert W. Hahn (2000), ‘The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy’
21. Wallace E. Oates (2000), ‘From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics’
22. Robert W. Hahn, Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins (2003), ‘Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis’
Name Index
